Description: The first part of this paper sketches a praxiological analysis of the moral education of the emotions. After briefly distinguishing between emotional education and emotional control or manipulation, we offer an analysis that delineates three conceptually distinct and mutually compatible interventions or strategies that are a common feature of everyday interactions between children and moral educators. These, in turn, suggest that the moral education of the emotions, as it is ordinarily conceived, has 3 principal concerns: (i) the emergence and enhancement of moral emotions like concern for others, sympathy and compassion (through perspective-taking); (ii) guidance in the moderation of emotional responses in conformity with an ideal of moral character or practical wisdom (through mimesis); and (iii) the development of the faculty of moral judgement and its capacity for the regulative constraint of emotionally-grounded desiderative tendencies (through re-appraisal) (cf. Maxwell & Reichenbach, 2005). Furthermore, we give reasons to suggest that these three aspects of the moral education of the emotions correspond with the three predominant theories of moral education. If this is correct, then, far from representing rival theories of the role of affect in moral life, at least as far as the education of the moral emotions is concerned, care ethics, character education and cognitive developmentalism would seem better conceptualised as being mutually complementary, each one being necessary for well-rounded moral-affective formation. The default position on this question, however, seems to be that the development of the capacity for the regulative constraint of the emotions via moral judgement and the habituation of a range of reflective and desiderative sensitivities in line with an ideal of good character take precedence over the enhancement of the moral emotions. This is for several apparently good reasons. First, it is a fairly obvious fact that, without regulation by the faculty of moral judgement, moral emotions can motivate morally bad as much as they can motivate morally good acts (cf. Snow, 2000; Verducci, 1999). Second, and as Blasi (1999) argues, even when emotions do motivate morally good acts it is not the emotion that accounts for moral motivation but rather the prior moral motivation-or "concern for morality" (p. 12)-from which the emotion itself arises. Third, emergence of a disposition of concern for others which imagination supposes seems to be primarily a problem of early-childhood socialization (Hoffman, 2000). Should a child fail to develop normally in this regard, there is little that standard educational regimes can do to rectify this (cf. Gibbs, 2003). The second part of the paper addresses these objections. Methodology: Praxiological and conceptual analysis. Conclusions: Without denying that each of the objections discussed above contains some important truth we argue that they each contain important oversights. With regards to first two objections, they overlook the fact that it seems to be difficult to account for a concern for morality, and in particular the idea of a normative obligation, in the absence of concern for the well-being of others. The third objection, we claim, runs together concern for the capacity for concern for others and the kind of universal or extended concern characteristic of a moral outlook (cf. Warnock, 1996; Nussbau, 2000). In particular, it overlooks the crucial role that education can play in fostering the latter. On these grounds, we conclude that emergence of concern for others, like the capacity to subject one's spontaneous moral responses to rational scrutiny and the development of complex forms of situational desiderative and affective sensibilities, is foundational to the moral education of the emotions.