Description: Plato and Aristotle are generally credited with the inauguration of what I will call the epistemological project. For these authors the archetype of knowledge is episteme - which loosely refers to an organised body of concepts articulated around theme or topic. Whilst, of course, the problem of the nature of knowledge, how it is known, what relationship it has to cognising subjects, how it is deployed, has been approached in disparate ways, the paper briefly looks at the way English speaking philosophers of the twentieth century have modelled it and conceptualised it particularly in situations where change as a result of, or informed by knowledge is, is an outcome. Firstly, knowledge, these philosophers say, is about belief. This is a cognitive disposition linked to a topic or content utterance. And secondly, in order to qualify as knowledge, they say, such a belief must need to be true (as against any number of theories of truth eg correspondence, coherence, pragmatism, etc), and be warranted or justified in some way (eg by custom or habit, by reason or argument, by the advancement of evidence using common criteria for assessment, by virtue of the testimony of one whom may know, etc). Such a historically privileged theorisation is powerful to the extent that it shows how knowledge and truth are linked, it also shows that knowledge, to be knowledge, must in some sense be consciously held by the knower and that one cannot be said to have knowledge unless one either espouses it, or genuinely holds it to be true. These distinctions are studied in the paper, and very brief sketches of some problems with this belief-focussed conceptualisation of knowledge are raised. Of these, for instance, a key problem raised in the paper is the limitations and success of the concepts defined in this way. Perhaps the best way to see this is to provisionally re-consider Aristotle's treatment of episteme in the Nichomedian Ethics. Here, as is well known, Artistotle distinguishes among episteme, techne and phronesis. If techne is roughly taken as craft skill and phronesis is taken as something like the modern notion of reflective practice, we can begin to glimpse the need - mainly of cognitive psychologists, cybernetics, learning theorists, educationalists and particularly theorists working under the sign of lifelong learning, and workplace learning - to broaden episteme substantially. The paper identifies and unpacks these needs and motivations and asks whether the inclusion of these concepts under the heading of knowledge, as is frequently proposed, can in fact be accomplished without rendering the notion of knowledge unintelligible. My argument is that 'knowledge' cannot meaningfully engage with episteme-techne-phronesis, and this can be demonstrated looking at the cultural-historical activity theory. What the paper discusses is this issue and the question of what are the epistemological values of activity theory? How does it or should it show how knowledge can be transferred? How is knowledge differentially? How is it mediated? In a nutshell I argue that knowledge is somewhat akin to the mediating artefacts of an activity system. I thus suggest that the key concept of knowledge, better understood, is that of mediation rather than belief/truth/justification. I would be inclined to say that knowledge a la mediation has twin modes of presentation. First, as object, knowledge is about a concretisation, it is has a direction pointing to the motive of an activity toward which knowledge refers. Secondly, as subject, knowledge constitutes the entire framework of the knower - that is includes the resources of knowing, being the set of available mediating artefacts, deployed for cognitive purposes. Moreover, these are supposed to be related to each other in a dialectical manner in which time and, in particular, history is everything. The paper then offers an outline of a critque of knowledge so construed. And this leads to the conclusion, in terms of the epistemological project dating back to Plato, Aristotle, the term knowledge (with all of its implications of timelessness) no longer suffices in contemporary settings. I suggest as an alternative, the new term, 'carriage'. This term connote movement, the notion is of transport, and not merely transport to any recipient, but to exactly the person/group the knowledge project is being directly.