Philosophers since Plato have argued that policy should be based on philosophy and, further, that it should be formulated by people who are philosophically educated. Philosophers of education are no exception. There are many recent examples of well-argued papers demonstrating that policy would benefit from philosophy (Fielding, 2000; McLaughlin, 2000; Biesta, 2007; Conroy, Davis and Enslin, 2008). Philosophers of education have given less attention to the practicability of these exhortations in current education policy contexts. If philosophy (of education) is to have an influence, then there has to be a way in which this influence can be exercised. We suggest this is most likely to occur in the ways that influence (if it exists) is in fact exercised by philosophy. So the following questions arise: (1) How does (educational) philosophy have a voice in educational policy (if it does)? (2) Are these influences good ones? (3) Are there better ways for philosophy to have a voice in policy? Various possible answers to the first question will be explored. They draw on a number of philosophical arguments but begin with the observation that philosophy is embodied in those who have had a philosophical education. Anecdotal evidence suggests that influence is exercised by philosophically educated people who move from academic institutions into policy ones, and may continue to move to and fro (Saunders, 2008). Alternatively it is exercised by individuals in contact for reasons other than discussing philosophy and specific policy agendas. This suggestion goes against commonly held views of a gulf separating academics and policy makers, and, indeed a presumption of homogeneity among those in both camps. Here we draw on notions of complex identities and embodiment (Merleau Ponty, 1945, Le Doeuff, 1989; Griffiths, 2006) and nomadic subjectivity (Lugones, 1989; Braidotti, 2001). We suggest that embodied philosophical influence is likely to be exercised during a continuing conversation, rather than in one-off encounters. Individuals may carry with them a philosophical sensibility and approach which influences how they contribute to conversations related to educational policy making. This suggestion is predicated on an understanding of there being various stages of policy making (Nutley, Walters and Davies, 2007). These include the identification of the problem and agenda setting, as well as implementation.

Some stages entail more exploratory conversation than others. Such conversational influence fits with our view of philosophy as concerned with wisdom and understanding rather than with information and techniques. Here we draw on the concept of narrative sociality (Wittel, 2001) and also on an Arendtian discussion of the co-construction of narratives (Arendt, 1958) within public space.

Finally we consider ways in which influence may be structured and intentional or, alternatively, the result of chance. We draw on the concept of smooth and striated spaces (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980). This concept is related to their concept of the nomad. Nomadic encounters are those that do not take place in designated places or spaces (sedentary, striated space), marked by the existence of ‘walls, enclosures and roads between enclosures’. Instead the nomad has encounters in spaces he happens to inhabit. These spaces do not come labeled AS philosophical space. Nomadic encounters are, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, rhizomatic, occurring in smooth spaces which have dissolved from the striated. We also note more formal, striated, attempts to enter the conversation. Therefore attention will be paid to auto/biographical stories of specific philosophically educated voices in the conversation of policy makers in recent times in the UK (Bridges, 2003; McLaughlin, 2000).