The "good manners" offer a comfort which favors a balance, and an emotional safety, in the social report. They constitute, for the child, the first mode of adaptation to the social life. It enters naturally the classic definition of the civility a common idea : it is the acquisition and the application of "checks" manners appropriate for a culture, recovering from a learning of the code of the ceremonial rules. This code teaches to the child the first gestures to like beyond itself. As Wittgenstein would have been able to say it, it is then the correct usage of the report in others which is shown to the child. I worked from the idea which to follow or to apply a rule supposes to make a boss of a technique, an usage, a custom (Wittgenstein, 1953). In its Philosophic Researches, Wittgenstein presents the question of the application of rules as a problem. To speak about rules implies their selection (which are rules established in the school), and their application (how to see to it that the pupils practise these rules). The general problem of rules is that we can never know how they are understood. Do they give place to a mechanical behavior, or a rational judgment in the particular circumstances of the action ? These acquired rules are registered in the individuals as technical mastery andor as a practice, always as forms of the social life as such. Wittgenstein emphasizes the analysis of the practice of rules, and it allows me now to think that the educational stake is not in the presentation of rules (named in pedagogy rules of life, rules of the class, the law, contract, etc.) in the pupils, but in a collective interrogation led permanently on the actual practices of the social report. It makes of the notion of "rule"(s)" a real problem for a didactics of the moral education. Can this mastery be thought in terms of continuous progress of the not moral action towards the moral action ?

As explains it Putnam (2004), the difficulty would already be thus to know if the values are discovered or created. This question articulates in that of the "rule" as problem. If we lean on a principle a priori of neutrality, it allows, according to Ogien (2006), to consider the question of the disadvantage made for others as the only pertinent moral problem. Thanks to a social institution which would be also spiritual, every pupil could be educated to pose as a person, to subjectiver. It seems careful to take this working idea on one in the sense of what commits us to fair relations with others. Involving the idea of a moral education, it would mean that during circumstances, that is during problematic situations in the social relationship, it is necessary to look for a tekhnè to produce effects considered valid by the school community.

What is important to envisage, it is that these effects would not be expected from the mechanical application of a normative rule, but from the creative imagination of the pupils engaged in a discussion about the problem : description, identification, interrogation of the experience, the questioning on the possibilities of developing the situation. That is why it would be necessary to think of the method of the education moral as essentially critical : the school community participating in a discussion about the conducts which are valorisables, and those which are not. It implies not to consider a priori that exists the systematic and ultimate moral truth, "rules" of which would be the objective demonstration. But it does not forbid the search for ethical judgments, thus for values, which are recognized by the community as (temporarily) valid enough.