Young people’s status as democratic citizens has remained an important issue on the agenda of politicians and policy makers over the past two decades. The focus on citizenship education has been fuelled with concerns about political participation and political understanding in general. It is commonly held that education has a fundamental role in creating future citizens, thus conceptualizing the age of youth as insufficiency in intellectual, ethical and social functioning, citizenship and democracy as some-thing to be achieved. In Rogue: Two essays on Reason, Derrida (2005) raise a surprisingly simple question that point to the difficulty in achieving any kind of true concept of democracy. He asks; can and/or must one speak democratically of democracy? (p 71). Derrida calls attention to the predicament of explaining democracy so that “anyone” could understand it. To do so, to “speak democratically about democracy” would by necessity impose a meaning of the word democratic and thus produce a consensus that one pretends to be accepted. The overall purpose of this paper is to exceed the concept of achieving democracy. The point of departure is taken in a couple of interviews of upper secondary students in Sweden on their values and concepts of democracy and justice. One specific question is singled out; ‘do we need a common idea of justice to reflect over and obey the law of a society?’ in order to discuss the limits of procedural or contractual relationships to the other and society. Talking about justice, the students discussions points to differences in details that relate to different contexts of justice. Despite these differences, the structure of deliberation on, the reasons the students give for, following the law of society shows a point were the talk about justice go beyond the contexts of traditional moral philosophy and social contract theory. Talking about justice there seems to be a point were we share to the full in the idea that some things are better while others are worse; it is better to follow the law than not to, it is better to pay taxes than not to, it is better to live in peace with other members of society than not to etc. Such evaluations are not included in the immanence of moral philosophy that goes back to Kant. Deontological theories are unable to deal with the question why one should be moral at all, they cannot generate a justification of legal norms that do not favour, or disadvantage, some groups (which inevitably interrupts state neutrality). This is what Derrida calls the relationship to the Other, (that which must interrupt ‘state neutrality’), and this relationship to the other is what he calls justice. Even though this transcendental element does not contain anything substantial – it is just this relation to the other – I am individuated in my obligations before the other, the other as interrogative “teaches” me. Maybe, talking about justice, one always needs to say may-be, justice may-be, not as (predictable) future but as a coming event that exceeds calculation, rules, programs. In the concluding paragraph I try to think of the political and education located in the interstices between a ‘democracy to come’ and ‘subject to come’, education must expose the foundations – limits – of clear objectives that must be hit, competencies to be achieved, of reason and virtues, through the ‘who’ of friendship that provokes conscience and opens up responsibility.

The overall purpose of this paper is to exceed the concept of achieving democracy.In the concluding paragraph I try to think of the political and education located in the interstices between a ‘democracy to come’ and ‘subject to come’, education must expose the foundations – limits – of clear objectives that must be hit, competencies to be achieved, of reason and virtues, through the ‘who’ of friendship that provokes conscience and opens up responsibility.