This paper argues that most students have a need to be punished in order for them to attain an authentic forgiveness for their misdemeanours. But a just punishment can only be such if it takes into account its concomitant need to be linked with a synchronicity for forgiveness. In other words, the punishment must already be embedded with its own forgiveness in such a manner that the punishment implies the latter to the transgressor; otherwise, the punishment cannot be authentic, but merely punishment for the sake of punishment. The latter is an untenable position in any context of accountability. He or she who punishes students must be responsible for that punishment in such a manner that the student will accept willingly the punishment accorded to him or her because that student is given to understand that the whole experience of punishment will ultimately provide its own reward of forgiveness. But how is this to be accomplished in such a manner that the punishment as it were does not, on the one hand, deteriorate into an insignificant whitewashing of any possible offence, or, on the other become a veritable crime of punishment in itself? This paper will attempt to clarify these problems and provide a concrete strategy by which a teacher can actualize in praxis the theory presented and implied in this paper. But what about students who do not seek punishment regardless of their serious transgressions. How are we to deal with such students? Are we to assume that there really are students who feel no remorse for their transgressions and thus avoid the need for punishment or any kind of accountability? And if there really is such a phenomenon as psychogenic nihilism what are its implications for education? Is it morally tenable to punish such an individual? And how are we to define such a phenomenon in light of socialization and phenomenological theories and the many influences that are derived from the parental-societal environment that may provide such an individual with a seeming inability to feel an accountability or remorse for one's actions? If we hold such individuals accountable then how can such an approach be morally authentic? To answer such a question one must seek new ways of conceptualizing individuals who seemingly feel no remorse or accountability for their misdemeanors. The result of such an enquiry into a philosophy of education must avoid the pitfalls of moral relativism on the one hand and the dire effects of nihilism on the other.