This desk-based philosophical inquiry explores two questions that any understanding of critical thinking must address: 1) How is it possible to think critically about what guides critical thinking itself? 2) How can critical thinking work across a diverse plurality of contexts? After situating these questions within critical thinking theory, they can be reframed in slightly more precise terms as: 1) What makes metacritique possible? 2) Given that critical thinking draws on contextually contingent normative aims and assumptions, how is it possible to avoid relativism? Addressing these questions requires considering some longstanding philosophical challenges that create tensions within any understanding of critical thinking. These include the problems of infinite regress, dogma, and circularity in the justification of knowledge.

In this paper, I show how one of the most dominant and influential conceptions of critical thinking, put forward by Siegel, addresses these questions and challenges in ways that unintentionally limit the scope of critical thinking. I contend that this confining of criticality happens because of a reliance on ‘transcendent’ escapes from the problems of infinite regress, circularity, and dogmatism to facilitate metacritique and avoid relativism. I argue that this is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, attempts to make critical thinking transcendent render it an empty process prone to (not protected from) relativism. Secondly, the notion of transcendence put forward by Siegel requires ‘objective’ and ‘neutral’ metacriteria to avoid relativism. I argue that no such perspectives or criteria are possible or necessary. Thirdly, to avoid empty instrumentalism and relativism, Siegel imposes substantive ‘universal values’ as defining features of critical thinking, which unintentionally moves towards dogmatism and inhibits criticality, particularly in diverse and cross-cultural contexts.

I argue that this unintentional dogmatic imposition derives from conflating the aims of education in particular contexts with the nature of critical thinking across all contexts. This is particularly problematic in cross-cultural education settings, where appeals to ‘universality’ may become exclusionary and uncritical. Drawing on Rorty, Sellars, Taylor, Berlin, and others, I argue that plurality is navigable on its own terms, without recourse to transcendent metacriteria or assumedly universal values. This is because critical frameworks do not need to be engaged with as wholes but as overlapping, intersecting, and interacting aspects of a shared world. Ultimately, I argue that a degree of relativism (perhaps better understood as pluralism in Berlin’s sense) provides possibilities, not problems, for critical thinking.

The core of my argument is that dominant conceptions of critical thinking unintentionally narrow the potential scope of criticality by imposing particular substantive values (framed as universal moral imperatives) from one context (multicultural liberal democracy) onto critical thinking in all contexts. My intention is not to suggest that critical thinking should (or could) proceed without values. Quite the contrary, I see values and many other aspects of being, as essential to critical thinking. What I take issue with is the imposition of  particular and assumedly universal values from one context as necessary and defining aspects of critical thinking in all contexts. I suggest that cultivating the values desirable for education, society, and critical thinking itself should not come through appeals to universality, but through critical engagement with the particulars of diverse contexts. Ultimately, I argue for the possible universalisation of ideals and values, as opposed to assumed universality, because the prior better supports ongoing criticality.

Following Pring’s approach to philosophical inquiry as a research methodology, this project aims to identify underlying assumptions and unexamined values within theory that may meaningfully impact practice (2000). This paper begins by identifying questions that can help reveal implicit assumptions that meaningfully shape theory and practice. These include questions about how metacritique is possible and relativism avoidable (or navigable). I focus on Siegel because his work explicitly and thoroughly addresses these questions. His work is also highly influential (for good reason) in the theory and practice of critical thinking within education. I also find Siegel’s depth and clarity particularly conducive to constructive discourse. In line with my focus on Siegel, I also focus on some of the thinkers with which he frequently engages. This leads me to draw on Rorty and Sellars (among others). I also bring in Taylor and Berlin, to explore the possibility that plurality is navigable on its own terms, without recourse to transcendent metacriteria or assumedly universal values. Part of my method in this project has included correspondence with Professor Siegel, who has been kind enough to review multiple drafts of this paper. While our positions remain disparate, this opportunity for critical dialogue adds a degree of rigour to this inquiry. This process has also helped confirm that while I critique aspects of Siegel’s thinking, I am in agreement with the majority of his work, including his tireless efforts to justify critical thinking as an educational aim – perhaps the most essential educational aim (2017; 2003; 1988). Ultimately, I aim to build on Siegel’s work and contribute ideas for further critical discussion.

This project aims to facilitate and support more inclusive and expansive understandings and applications of critical thinking, with particular attention to intercultural dialogue and navigation of seemingly incommensurable disagreement. This is important because the world is simultaneously more interconnected and ideologically fractured than ever. Modern technology facilitates the movement of people and ideas, local politics play out with transnational implications, and problems (like the ecological crisis) impact the world on a planetary scale. We are awash in an abundance of information (and disinformation) often untethered from shared notions of truth or common values to guide discourse and judgment. There are individuals and groups within and across societies gripped by ideology and dogmatism, with no regard for criticality. Social and political discourse are riddled with cognitive biases and logical fallacies. However, many people are also working very hard to be reasonable and think critically. This often involves reasoning soundly from diverse assumptions toward divergent aims, with different criteria and standards guiding critical thinking. In such cases, people may be thinking critically but incommensurably. Indeed, incommensurability is regularly embraced through appeals to individual subjectivism and relativism manifesting in a ‘you do you’ mentality. An eagerness to ‘agree to disagree’ hides an unwillingness to think critically about what underlies disagreements. However, the ‘you do you’ mentality only works in a world where people never need to do anything together. This is not how the world works. People cannot avoid the need to think critically together. This raises challenging questions about how to navigate plurality without either lapsing into relativism or leaning on dogmatism. How is it possible for people with radically different understandings of the world to think critically together without imposing the particulars of one way of thinking on all ways of thinking? This paper aims to contribute toward addressing these needs.

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