Inequity and Procedural Unfairness in Access to Higher Education: A Longitudinal Analysis
Author(s):
Tiago Neves (presenting / submitting) Gil Nata
Conference:
ECER 2014
Format:
Paper

Session Information

23 SES 02 C, HE, Diversity, Inclusion and Justice

Paper Session

Time:
2014-09-02
15:15-16:45
Room:
B334 Sala de Aulas
Chair:
Jacqueline-Aundree Baxter

Contribution

Access to higher education is affected by inequalities worldwide (Almeida et al. 2012; Brennan and Naidoo 2008; Brunori et al. 2012; Liu 2011; Marginson 2011). To be sure, the expansion of higher education systems and the democratisation of access have resulted in greatly increased participation rates. However, that does not necessarily amount to significant improvements in social equity because the upper classes have been disproportionately benefited by the massification of higher education (Rahona López 2009, p. 286). Portugal is a fine example of this situation: in the past 25 years it has moved from an elite to a mass system; yet, the probability of a Portuguese student attending higher education if parents have high levels of education is more than 3 times higher than the proportion of such families in the population (OECD 2012). Similar phenomena have also been identified in studies conducted in a number of countries (Marginson 2011; Mora 1997; Rahona López 2009). Therefore, important inequalities in access persist.

Inequalities in access derive from cultural, economic and procedural factors (Buisson-Fenet and Draelants 2012; Frempong et al. 2012; Wikström and Wikström 2005). Recasting cultural and economic factors is extremely hard as these are, by definition, deeply ingrained in any given context. In this change-resistant context, Marginson (2011) suggests that interventions targeted at specific points of the inequalities’ constellation are more effective than attempts to overhaul the system. This is where the fine-tuning of procedural elements in access to higher education may become instrumental in curtailing the reproduction and reinforcement of educational inequalities (Duru-Bellat and Mingat 1988; Konečný et al. 2012; Rahona López 2009; Wikström 2005). To do so requires the identification of precise, specific procedural elements that have a significant negative impact on the pursuit of fairness and social justice in access to higher education.

The study we present here deals with one of those procedural elements. Specifically, we set out to verify the validity of the nationally (in Portugal) widespread rumour that independent private, fee-paying secondary schools give their students better scores than they deserve; that is, by engaging in grade-inflation practices (Allen 2005; Brighouse 2008). This would unfairly improve their chances of accessing to public higher education, which rests on a national competition based on a weighted average of upper secondary school scores and scores obtained in national exams. As independent private, fee-paying secondary schools are accessible only to the wealthier classes, this means that if the rumour proves to be true, educational inequalities are being reinforced. Therefore, from a social justice perspective, it would be advantageous to introduce procedural corrections in the access system.   

To assess the validity of the rumour, we present an empirical study based on a large, 11 years database on scores in upper secondary education in Portugal, totalling more than 3.000.000 valid cases.

Method

Portugal is one of the few European countries that publish school scores on national exams (European Commission, 2012: 45). Since the school year 2001/2002 those data are made freely available for download by the National Exams Committee, an agency of the Ministry of Education (see here: http://www.dgidc.min-edu.pt/jurinacionalexames/index.php?s=directorio&pid=4). The observation unit of these databases is the national exam. That is, information is provided relative to each and every national exam undertaken throughout these 11 years. Information is provided on the following variables, among others: school name; nature of the school (public or private); exam subject (e.g., Maths, Portuguese, Physics, …); student score in that national exam; student score in his/her school of origin in that subject. In this research we were concerned only with the combination of three variables: internal score, score in national exam, and school nature (public or private). We analysed the data from all the databases available (2001/2 to 2012/13), totalling more than 3.000.000 pairs of scores in national exams/internal scores. The data do not include any personal student identifier. It is also important to stress that this study deals with the entire population of pairs of internal scores/scores in national exams for the 12 years considered. Therefore, because we are not dealing with samples, there is no need to resort to inferential statistics in the analysis. To achieve our goal – that is, to put the grade-inflation rumour to the test (Justino 2005) – we looked for systematic differences in internal scores relative to scores in national exams across the different types of schools. This means that national exams were used as the basis for comparison. We simply subtracted each student’s score in a national exam from his/her internal score in the same subject. Thus, for each one of the more than 3 million national exam score/internal score pairs, we got a value representing the difference between the score that the student got in his or her school and the score that he or she was able to achieve in the national exam on that particular subject (e.g., Maths, Portuguese, and Physics). In addition, we also calculated the difference between internal scores and national exams’ scores throughout the entire range of scores obtained by students in national exams; this was instrumental in identifying where grade-inflation occurs the most (in low, mid, or high scores).

Expected Outcomes

Our results show clearly that independent private, fee-paying schools inflate their students' scores when compared to both public and government-dependent private schools. It is also plain that this discrepancy is not uniformly distributed across grades: rather, it is higher where scores matter most in the competition for the scarce places available in public higher education. Furthermore, the analysis of 11 and over 3.000.000 million pairs of scores in national exams/internal scores shows that (on average) grade-inflation amounts to as much as 1 score point (out of 20). We will present data on the magnitude of the effect of this grade-inflation on admission to higher education. Given this, it is important to introduce procedural adjustments in the system of access to higher education in order to prevent the reinforcement of social inequalities and, instead, promote fair competition and social justice. We suggest two ways of dealing with this problem: (i) to stop using internal scores as a factor determining access to higher education or (ii) to make some kind of a posteriori correction to the scores attributed by schools.

References

Allen, J. (2005). Grades as Valid Measures of Academic Achievement of Classroom Learning. The Clearing House, 78(5), 218-223. Almeida, L., Marinho-Araujo, C. M., Amaral, A., and Dias, D. (2012). Democratização do acesso e do sucesso no ensino superior: uma reflexão a partir das realidades de Portugal e do Brasil. Avaliação: Revista da Avaliação da Educação Superior, 17(03), 899-920. Brennan, J., and Naidoo, R. (2008). Higher education and the achievement (and/or prevention) of equity and social justice. Higher Education, 56(3), 287-302. Brighouse, H. (2008). “Grade Inflation and Grade Variation: What’s All the Fuss About?”. In L. H. Hunt, (ed.), Grade Inflation: Academic Standards in Higher Education. New York: SUNY Press, 73-92. Brunori, P., Peragine, V., and Serlenga, L. (2012). Fairness in education: The Italian university before and after the reform. Economics of Education Review, 31(5), 764-777. Buisson-Fenet, H., and Draelants, H. (2012). School-linking processes: describing and explaining their role in the social closure of French elite education. Higher Education, 66(1), 39-57. Duru-Bellat, M., and Mingat, A. (1988). Le déroulement de la scolarité au collège : le contexte «fait des différences». Revue française de sociologie, 29(4), 649-666. European Commission. (2012). Key data on education in Europe 2012. Brussels: Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency. Frempong, G., Ma, X., and Mensah, J. (2012). Access to postsecondary education: can schools compensate for socioeconomic disadvantage? Higher Education, 63(1), 19-32. Justino, D. (2005). No silêncio somos todos iguais, Lisboa: Gradiva. Konečný, T., Basl, J., Mysliveček, J., and Simonová, N. (2012). Alternative models of entrance exams and access to higher education: the case of the Czech Republic. Higher Education, 63(2), 219-235. Liu, A. (2011). Unraveling the myth of meritocracy within the context of US higher education. Higher Education, 62(4), 383-397. Marginson, S. (2011). Equity, status and freedom: a note on higher education. Cambridge Journal of Education, 41(1), 23-36. Mora, J.-G. (1997). Equity in Spanish higher education. Higher Education, 33(3), 233–249. OECD. (2012). Education at a Glance 2012: OECD Indicators. Brussels: OECD Publishing. Rahona López, M. (2009). Equality of opportunities in Spanish higher education. Higher Education, 58(3), 285-306. Wikström, C. (2005). Grade stability in a criterion‐referenced grading system: the Swedish example. Assessment in Education: Principles, Policy & Practice, 12(2), 125-144. Wikström, C., and Wikström, M. (2005). Grade inflation and school competition: an empirical analysis based on the Swedish upper secondary schools. Economics of Education Review, 24(3), 309-322.

Author Information

Tiago Neves (presenting / submitting)
University of Porto
FPCEUP
Porto
Universidade do Porto
Porto

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