The Conceptualisation of 'Language Legitimacy'

Author(s):

Timothy Reagan(presenting / submitting)

Conference:

ECER 2015

Network:

13. Philosophy of Education

Format:

Paper

Session Information

13 SES 04 B, Language, Concepts and Translation

Paper Session

Time:

2015-09-09

09:00-10:30

Room:

330. [Main]

Chair:

Sharon Todd

Contribution

Introduction

Whether making claims of logical superiority, of the holiness of a particular language, or striving to be sure that ‘proper’ language use is maintained, one is engaged in attitudes and practices that are firmly grounded in the ideology of ‘linguistic legitimacy’. The core idea at the heart of this ideology is that particular languages or language varieties are innately superior in some fundamental way to others. There are multiple settings in which linguistic legitimacy occurs: in everyday social discourse, in educational institutions, in politics and political discourse, and in scholarly settings. It is not only factually wrong in all of these contexts, it is also potentionally destructive and oppressive. Nevertheless, it is incredibly common in all of these contexts, and most of us – even those of us who should know better -- are susceptible to it from time to time. This presentation will involve an in-depth philosophical analysis of the concept of ‘linguistic legitimacy’, including the related concepts ‘language’, ‘language variety’ and ‘language purism’. This conceptual analysis of ‘linguistic legitimacy’ will then be applied to a number of contemporary examples, including the case of Romani, the signed languages used by the Deaf, Esperanto and other international auxiliary languages, and an historical example, the perceptions of Yiddish during the pre-World War II period, especially in Germany and Eastern Europe.

Research Questions

The basic research questions to be addressed in this presentation are: (1) What is ‘linguistic legitimacy’? (2) How is ‘linguistic legitimacy’ manifested in the case of a number of selected languages in varying social and educational settings? and (3) Insofar as ‘linguistic legitimacy’ can be considered to be an ideology, what risks are associated with it from social and educational perspectives?

Conceptual Framework

The concept ‘linguistic legitimacy’ is both a timely and important one for educators, since it entails issues of social class, ethnicity, and culture, as well as being embedded in relations of dominance and power. ‘Linguistic legitimacy’ as a construct is also important with respect to the implications that it has for the development and implementation of educational policy, as numerous educational controversies around the world attest. The conceptual analysis to be offered in this presentation will entail the nature and history of the concept ‘linguistic legitimacy’, and the conditions under which it can be said to be present in policy and pedagogical practice.

Following the conceptual analysis of ‘linguistic legitimacy’, examples of how this ideology functions in discourse about a number of special languages will be discussed. The first to be examined will be that of Romani, and common in-group and out-group attitudes and beliefs. The rejection of the signed languages used by the deaf will be explored, and a comparison will be drawn between the British and Scandinavian approaches to the use and legal status of signed languages. Next, attitudes and beliefs about the linguistic legitimacy and reality of artificially constructed such as Esperanto will be considered. Finally, the historical case of Yiddish, which was commonly rejected as ‘jargon’ rather than a real language in the pre-World War II era, will be briefly examined.

Once the conceptual analysis and examination of various examples of ‘linguistic legitimacy’ have been explored, a brief counter-argument will be presented, suggesting the serious social and educational harm that such an ideology can result in are unacceptable on both linguistic and educational grounds.

Method

Muirhead (2009) recently employed conceptual analysis in addressing the complex notion of ‘culture’ in world language education. His work provides a clear example of the continuing power of such analysis. Muirhead quoted Coombs and Daniels’ argument that the point of conceptual analysis is “understanding and improving the sets of concepts or conceptual structures in terms of which we interpret experience, express purposes, frame problems, and conduct inquiries” (1991, p. 27). In other words, conceptual analysis can be understood as a potentially powerful research methodology distinct from either traditional quantitative research or any of the current qualitative or naturalist research methodologies. Although this might suggest that conceptual analysis is a new approach to research, this is of course by no means the case. Conceptual analysis has been widely used in analytic philosophy, and in analytic philosophy of education, in the Anglophone world from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, although it has declined in popularity in recent years. As Noddings has noted, “Conceptual analysis, fascinating as it is, probably cannot meet all of the needs of actual teachers in actual schools” (1995, p. 56). This is obviously true, of course, but the fact that conceptual analysis cannot meet all of our needs does not mean that it cannot contribute in significant and valuable ways to our understanding. In both scholarly discussions and educational practice, we employ many concepts that are both essential to scholarly, educational and pedagogical endeavors, and which are often used in ways that suggest we have not yet clearly established or determined their meaning in a thoughtful and reflective manner. As Soltis observed, "Many of us . . . would be hard pressed if asked to spell out in simple words the ideas which are contained in such ordinary concepts of education as teaching, learning, or subject matter. Yet these very concepts are basic to any intelligent thought or discussion about education. Furthermore, I believe that an explication of these ideas would invariably result in the unveiling of important nuances of meaning which we unconsciously assume in our discourse and actions as students or teachers. As a result, we would not only become more sophisticated and careful in their use, but we would also gain a deeper insight into education as a human endeavor" (1978, p. 7). This study, then, will employ conceptual analysis as its primary philosophical methodology in analyzing ‘linguistic legitimacy’.

Expected Outcomes

In this presentation, a conceptual analysis of ‘linguistic legitimacy’ will be offered, and it will be suggested that the criteria that are used to distinguish ‘legitimate’ from ‘illegitimate’ languages are themselves irrelevant, and that they are often used to disguise personal, political and ideological biases. It will be argued, based on a number of examples, that the very notion of an ‘illegitimate’ language or language variety is simply not a defensible one, and further, that the distinctions upon which notions of ‘linguistic legitimacy’ rest (including that of the difference between a ‘dialect’ and a ‘language’) are extralinguistic in nature and representative of non-linguistic social and political agendas.

References

Aspin, D. (1995). Logical empiricism, post-empiricism and education. In P. Higgs (ed.), Metatheories in philosophy of education (pp. 21-49). Johannesburg: Heinemann. Bernstein, R. (1983). Beyond objectivism and relativism: Science, hermeneutics and praxis. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Coombs, J., & Daniels, L. (1991). Philosophical inquiry: Conceptual analysis. In E. Short (ed.), Forms of curriculum inquiry (pp. 27-41). Albany: State University of New York Press. Dearden, R., Hirst, P., & Peters, R. S. (Eds.). (1972a). Education and the development of reason, Part 1: A critique of current educational aims. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Dearden, R., Hirst, P., & Peters, R. S. (Eds.). (1972b). Education and the development of reason, Part 2: Reason. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Dearden, R., Hirst, P., & Peters, R. S. (Eds.). (1972c). Education and the development of reason, Part 3: Education and reason. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Hirst, P. (1973). Liberal education and the nature of knowledge. In R. S. Peters (ed.), The Philosophy of education (pp. 87-111). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hirst, P. (1993). Education, knowledge and practices. In R. Barrow & P. White (eds.), Beyond liberal education (pp. 184-199). London: Routledge. Hirst, P., & Peters, R. S. (1970). The logic of education. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Noddings, N. (1995). Philosophy of education. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Peters, R. S. (Ed.). (1973a). The concept of education. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Peters, R. S. (Ed.). (1973b). The philosophy of education. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Soltis, J. (1978). An introduction to the analysis of educational concept (2nd ed.). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Author Information

Timothy Reagan (presenting / submitting)

Nazarbayev University

Graduate School of Education

Astana

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