Conspiracy theories pose a major threat to democracy and cohesion in society because they undermine trust in state institutions and jeopardize the credibility of scientific knowledge (Mancosu et al. 2017). Social crises such as the war in Ukraine serve as a particular breeding ground for conspiracy theories (Lamberty et al. 2022). Among young people in particular, it is therefore a key task of the education system to counteract the spread of conspiracy theories. In order to undertake targeted educational policy measures, it is important to identify factors that promote the spread of such narratives among adolescents. However, studies to date have primarily focused on adults (for a review, see Douglas et al. 2019). This study addresses this research gap with the following research question: What social and political factors promote the emergence of conspiracy theories about the war in Ukraine among youth?

Primarily social psychological research on factors conducive to conspiracy theories distinguishes between psychological and socio-political factors. The first group includes psychological disorders such as negative attitudes toward authority, low self-esteem, and even schizotypal personality disorders. The second group describes demographic factors and personal values and attitudes, making it particularly relevant to educational science. The literature on determinants of conspiracy theories among adults shows that especially people who feel socially excluded, have low income, or belong to marginalized groups (e.g., Muslims) are prone to conspiracy theories (Uenal 2016; Uscinski & Parent 2014; Wilson & Rose 2013). In addition, supporters of far-right parties as well as individuals with a strong national identity and a great distrust in political institutions show high approval ratings for conspiracy theories (Edelson et al. 2017; Imhoff & Bruder 2014). Finally, some authors emphasize the importance of historical context (Nattrass 2013). Based on these findings on adults, we derive the following hypotheses on the prevalence of conspiracy theories on the Ukraine war among adolescents:

H1: Adolescents who feel socially marginalized are more inclined to conspiracy theories.

H2: Adolescents with perceived low income are more inclined to conspiracy theories.

H3: Muslim youth are more likely to engage in conspiracy theories.

H4: Adolescents who are supporters of the far-right party “Alternative für Deutschland” (alternative for Germany) (H4a) and adolescents with a pronounced national identity (H4b) are more likely to engage in conspiracy theories.

H5: The greater the distrust in political institutions among young people, the greater the belief in conspiracy theories.

H6: East German youths are more inclined to conspiracy theories than West German youths.

The aim of the article is to use the example of the current war in Europe to show what dangers current political developments can pose for the development and deepening of conspiracy beliefs among young people and thus for democracy. In view of the political developments in many European countries, the results are not only relevant for Germany and can be transferred in parts to other national contexts.

The present study was conducted among young people between the ages of 16 and 29 in Germany between June 24 and July 26, 2022. The data was collected online with the support of a survey institute. The sample is quota-representative for all federal states and includes N=3240 persons. For the survey of belief in conspiracy theories in the context of the Ukraine war, items from a representative survey among adults were used (Lamberty et al. 2022). Examples include “Putin is made a scapegoat for everything by the West in order to distract from the real problems” and “Western media can no longer be trusted when they report on the war in Ukraine”. In addition, demographic information about respondents was collected, such as religious affiliation, perceived income or geographic location. Furthermore, existing instruments were used to ask for social inclusion, national identity and trust in political institutions. Hypotheses were tested using a structural equation model that included control variables such as age, gender, and education level in addition to the variables tested in the hypotheses. A structural equation model represents “a collection of statistical techniques that allow a set of relationships between one or more independent variables (…) and one or more dependent variables (…) to be examined” (Ullmann & Bentler 2013, p. 661). It involves multiple regression analyses and therefore allows to systematically test multiple independent variables and their relations to each other.

The results of the analysis show that the calculated structural equation model has good fit measures and the model is suitable to explain proportionally the belief in conspiracy theories on the Ukraine war among youth (RMSEA=.063; CFI=.82; TLI=.80). The results confirm the hypotheses to a large extent. Thus, supporters of the Alternative für Deutschland as well as adolescents with great distrust in political institutions and a pronounced national identity show high approval ratings for conspiracy theories. The same applies to young members of marginalized religions. This is in line with previous research on marginalized groups and extends it on a specific, in this context under-researched group, in Germany. Although the direct effects of social exclusion and perceived low income are not significant, these relationships are mediated as indirect effects via distrust in institutions. Thus, in addition to confirming the expected effects for adolescents, it appears that it is precisely such mistrust in politics that is problematic among youth an increases belief in conspiracy theories. Therefore, in addition to general right-wing extremist and nationalist tendencies, it is the addressing of this lack of trust that represents a central task of citizenship education in preventing conspiracy theories. The results also point to a great general need to catch up in the area of citizenship education, especially for minority groups and the socially disadvantaged, but also for young people in eastern Germany.

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