The importance of manners respectively mannerly behaviour for living together democratically and also socially is generally underestimated in enlightenment and post-enlightenment perspectives (Carter 1998; Fumat 2000; Peyrat 2005). And, of course, only laws and justice would seem to be convincing alternatives to „merely“ contingent conventions. The paper tries to bear out the idea that basic civic behavior (cf. Alheit 2000) – which could, despite some denotative differences in the concepts, be construed as conventions and manners – is not simply a superfluous surplus but can be seen as a precondition for morality, law and politics (Vec 2004) – and therefore is crucial to moral and democratic education (Reichenbach 2008). While there certainly are superfluous or even dysfunctional customs and conventions the absence of which we would hardly notice, under an ontogenetic perspective it is evident that conventional judgment and action developmentally precedes moral judgement and action, even though children can already distinguish between morality and convention (if they are „properly“ guided by questions - cf. the works of Nucci/Turiel 1983, 1993). While civic and mannerly behaviour, here seen as a distancing from an all too authentic and spontaneous expression of emotion, on the one hand, implies and presupposes a certain "ethos of deception" (cf. Nyberg 1996) in living together socially, on the other hand, it is undeniable that especially democratic politics and subpolitics can do away neither with a commitment to a fundamental truth, especially factual truth nor the virtue of truthfulness (Arendt 2006). Of course, claims to truth can hardly be negotiated and tested in the political process. Furthermore, truth can hardly be said to count among the political virtues. To the latter issues we turn in the second part of the paper. The notion of civility is not particularly prominent in the debate on education and democracy which usually is focussed rather on questions of competence. And, in this context, the notion of manners seems marginal. Perhaps it is also unpopular, since it comes across as conservative. But both notions are related and their history is manifold and entangled (cf. Elwitz 1973). When egalitarian ideals started to rise in the 18th century and the courtly frame of reference towards which the ethics of the estate system and its etiquette were oriented (cf. Vec 2004) became increasingly suspicious, morality and law gained in impetus and the loss of good manners could appear more acceptable (cf. Schneiders 1985). Not only the common origins of morality, law and manners, but also the extant link between manners and morality as well as the function of manners for morality could all too easily be ignored by anticipatory enlightenment enthusiasm. With reference to Norbert Elias (1969) „civility“ can be understood as a special form of moderation and self-control that, in turn, is amenable to the peaceful co-existence of human beings (Alheit 2000; Döbler 2000). In the paper I will try to highlight some of the major problems but also possibilities of focusing on aspects of (the concept of) mannerly behavior in contemporary discourse on democratic education.

Conceptual as well as historical. Some of the major arguments are based on empirical studies of moral development and civic education.

The paper tries to show that members of civil societies have to recognize - and actucally do recognize - both, on the one hand, the importance and basality of truth claims that shape the political sphere and the widest sense of a democratic ethos from without and, on the other, the importance of mannerly forms of conduct that keep on challenging anew the ability of distancing oneself from rigid pursuits of truth and a dogmatic imperative of truthfulness. Being able to distance oneself from otherwise justified claims in a situaltionally appropriate manner without giving them up is a feat of mannerly groups and individuals.