Private schools often reinforce social inequalities. They usually require active parental choice and are rarely the default. This study examines why parents in a German city choose private schools over public ones and how this decision affects social inequality. The theoretical framework is based on Kristen’s (2005) three-stage school choice model, adapted for private school selection: Stage 1: Perception of Alternatives: The first stage investigates whether parents recognize private primary schools as a viable option. Research indicates that parents with lower educational attainment (Schwarz et al., 2017) or an immigrant background (Kristen, 2005) are less likely to engage in active school choice. Stage 2: Evaluation of Alternatives: Parents weigh costs and benefits using an extended rational choice framework, such as subjective expected utility theory (Savage, 1954; Esser, 1999). Considerations include tuition fees and commuting distances (Wrase & Helbig, 2016), as well as educational goals influenced by social milieus, which may align more with private schools than public ones (Mayer & Koinzer, 2019). Stage 3: School Access Stage: Private schools actively attract and select students, often prioritizing families with educational advantages (Krüger, 2015). Unlike public schools, they can use selective admission practices (Reimann et al., 2020), which incentivize private schools favouring high-income families. Using Kristen’s (2005) three-stage model as a foundation, this study investigates the stages at which social inequalities emerge in private school choice and explores how different parental socio-economic backgrounds influence educational decisions. Therefore, data were collected via a survey of 1,858 parents of first-graders in Erfurt during the 2020/21 school year, achieving a 47% response rate (N = 873; analysed sample: 683 families). Erfurt, a large city with 29 public and six private primary schools, provided a diverse school landscape. The survey measured socio-economic background via parents’ education levels and immigration status. Quantitative analyses, including linear regression, identified factors influencing private school applications and attendance. In order to show that inequalities already exist at the first stage, parents who did not apply to a private school were asked whether they were aware of this option. The second stage analysis examined how differences in information, evaluations, and school choice motives explain disparities in private school applications. At the third stage, differences in the application and acceptance rates were analysed. The findings reveal that private school attendance is strongly influenced by parents’ socio-economic backgrounds. Across all three stages, parents with lower educational attainment are underrepresented compared to academically educated parents.

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