In the German history books on education of the last century an interesting observation can be made: The very old philosophical and philological "problem of Socrates" (Werner Jaeger) is entirely neglected. Whereas philosophers and philologists have been battling for almost two hundred years, whether one should trust Plato or Xenophon and what to make of Aristophanes' account, how and whether the description of the historical Socrates and his philosophy may be possible, the German histories of education simply ignore such questions. They use only Plato as a source and yet easily distinguish Plato's from Socrates' ›philosophy‹. Furthermore their account of Socrates' ›philosophy‹ is always much shorter than that of Plato's. My paper will explore this interesting ignorance of the "problem of Socrates", the unequal treatment of Socrates and Plato and their arbitrary separation. Firstly, I will analyze the ›mechanics‹ and function of this strange lack in the German histories of education. Secondly, I will show that these ›mechanics‹ have a powerful tradition, which influences the reception of Socrates in education up to the present.In the first part, starting with two histories of education of the late 19th century, I demonstrate how the dichotomies of life and work on the one hand and philosophy and pedagogy on the other are applied to Socrates and Plato. Furthermore, when Socrates' method is explored, two sides are always set apart: A ›negative‹ side (i.e. irony, paradoxes, aporia) and a ›positive‹ one (i.e. the building of knowledge), which overcomes the first one. These dichotomies also characterize the histories of education in 20th century: Plato is the founder of a systematic pedagogy, whereas Socrates is seen as a ›strange‹ philosopher. Thus, an exact analysis of the accounts of Socrates and Plato in the histories of education allows to prove, how the histories of education can expel ›negativity‹ from their very beginning by ignoring the "problem of Socrates".In the second part of the paper I will examine Campe's Kleine Seelenlehre (1780), the history of "Socratic Teaching" (Sokratisieren) and the new catechisms promoted by the "enlightened" pedagogues: They disregard Socrates' ›negativity‹, as well (like Plato's dialogues ending with an aporia). The same unawareness can be found in German educational theories of the 20th century claiming to be ›Socratic‹, e.g. in Nelson's "Socratic conversations" or Wagenschein's theory of learning. Thus my paper aims to describe the consequences and the ›mechanics‹ of the abbreviated account of Socrates as can be found in the history and theory of education.