For economists, collective skills formation as opposed to individual skills formation in a liberal market economy provides more firm financed training at the price of labor market regulations, either through state interventions, collective bargaining or other agreements between employers and trade unions. The necessity of these interventions is caused by the fact that collective skills formation creates incentives for free-riding which would destroy the collective effort. For many years therefore, there seemed to be a trade-off between skills provision and the efficiency of the labor market (see Acemoglu & Pischke, 1999). This paper sheds new light on this apparent trade-off comparing empirically the German and the Swiss apprenticeship training system. Both systems are rather similar in respect to their collective skills formation systems but quite different in respect to the degree of state interventions in the market and the role of trade-unions. The role of these labor market regulations and institutions is highlighted with empirical data from both countries covering the first decade of this century. Reference: Acemoglu, Daron and Pischke, Joern-Steffen (1999). The structure of wages and investment in general training. Journal of Political Economy, 107 (3), 539–572.