This paper considers that for a subject area which prides itself on the rich possibilities which exist for experiential learning, those associated with physical education would benefit from critiquing the detail of understanding experience a little more. For while we all share the same sensory apparatus this does not mean we experience things or even understand experiences in the same way. In this light, we draw upon the phenomenological writings of Merleau-Ponty as his naturalistic account of subjectivity can provide a theoretically sound basis for understanding experiences better and for embodiment to become more central to physical education aims. Such a focus dovetails with developments in phenomenology where elaborations about the inner processes of interactional livings between the body and consciousness have benefitted from the separating out of the animate body (Leib) from the inert physical body (Körper). Pivotal to this way of thinking is an understanding of transcendental subjectivities, particularly the way in which the nature of being-in-the-world precedes conscious thought and pre-reflective experiences. In this way, the eye and the mind can reinterpret bodily awareness through an intertwining that exhibits itself through language and speech (Merleau-Ponty, 1964/1968). On this basis, phenomenology can contribute to our understanding of experience and to appreciating how embodiment can capture the complexities between the intersubjective nature of our experiences and the social and cultural contexts within which we live. However, as the everyday nature of experience often requires that the hidden intentionality of experiences becomes more visible, Merleau-Ponty developed his ontology of the flesh (chair) as a device for understanding better the sensation of experience and the connections between human beings and the world. Additionally, Merleau-Ponty’s account of intercorporeality makes it possible to understand the meanings of other’s action because it is based on how we relate to people when we engage with others through vicarious experience of another e.g. smiling together, responding to gestures and signals.

Nevertheless, one criticism of phenomenology is that some of the concepts are difficult to unpack in ways which can provide methodological insights or aid reflection, particularly for practitioners and researchers in educational contexts. Thus, there is a need where bodily activities and language interchange with each other to share an appreciation of the connectedness of our intersubjective being. This position chimes with Stolz’s (2015) contention that the part embodiment plays in how students perceive themselves and navigate their world and interrelationships with others is vital to comprehend. Related to this perspective, more recent work by Thorburn and Stolz (2017) describes how a dance-related example could merge practical experiential learning with democratically-informed conversations on poise, precision, projection, relationships, the uses of space, feeling, mood, and ideas on music in order to enhance meaningful learning and a shared sense of purpose. Thorburn and Stolz (2017) argue that this example would benefit from pedagogical practices which enabled extended opportunities for students to practice reflection and deliberation as these types of experiences contain the capacity to respond in dynamic rather than predetermined routinized ways. In this way, embodied habits could become deep-rooted and resistant to other school and societal pressures which may conflict with regular engagement with embodied activity in physical education.

This is a detailed conceptual study which draws upon library based study of reading and re-reading leading founders of phenomenology such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty e.g. texts such as: Husserl, E. (1952/1989). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy – Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1942/1963). The structure of behavior. Pittsburgh, PA.: Duquesne University Press. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945/1962). Phenomenology of perception. London: Routledge. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1951/1964). The child’s relations with others. In W. Cobb (Trans.), The primacy of perception (pp. 96-155). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. as well as related secondary readings such as: Carmen, T. (2008). Merleau-Ponty. London: Routledge. Daly, A. (2018). A Phenomenological Grounding of Feminist Ethics, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2018.1487195 Dillon, M. C. (1997). Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2012). The phenomenological mind. London: Routledge. O’ Loughlin, M. (1998). Paying Attention to Bodies in Education: theoretical resources and practical suggestions, Educational Philosophy and Theory, 30(3), 275-297. O’Loughlin, M. (2006). Embodiment and education: exploring creatural existence. Netherlands: Springer. Prain, V., Coxa, P., Deeda, C., Dorman, J., Edwards, D. Farrelly, C … Yager, Z. (2013). Personalised learning: lessons to be Learnt, British Educational Research Journal, 39(4), 654-676. Reynolds, J. (2004). Merleau-Ponty and Derrida: Intertwining Embodiment and Alterity. Ohio University Press: Ohio.

This critical paper challenges some of the flawed assumptions made about shared experiences leading to similar outcomes in education. In addressing these complex concerns, we have drawn upon aspects of phenomenology, most notably some of the later writings of Merleau-Ponty as the basis for providing a theoretically sound basis for understanding embodied experiences, and thereafter for explaining how phenomenological data can if utilised properly bridge the gap between the subjective and objective. In outlining our position further, we map out how interactions between the self and other can best be considered as being largely a perceptual matter in many everyday circumstances. Furthermore, through noting concerns that the school curriculum continues to render the body as problematic for students and teachers alike, especially in terms of the more expressive aspects of movement, we conclude by outlining how some of the general and subject specific educational-related applications of Merleau-Ponty’s theorising could enhance the prospects of embodied experiences becoming more central to educational aims. If taken forward in practice, this will require in due course a greater focus on pedagogical intentionality and the complexities of professional thought and tact.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964/1968). The Visible and the Invisible. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Stolz, S. A. (2015). Embodied Learning, Educational Philosophy and Theory, 47(5), 474-487. Thorburn, M. and Stolz, S. A. (2017). Embodied learning and school-based physical culture: implications for professionalism and practice in physical education, Sport, Education and Society, (22)6, 721-731.