The focus of this study is on a mandatory course in Chinese higher education – ideological-political education (IPE) – and the widespread political slogans known as the Core Socialist Values (CSVs), promoted by the Chinese authorities (Gow, 2017; MoE, 2018). This study of IPE in Chinese higher education explores how CSVs are introduced in this mandatory course. It draws on the literature of democratic citizenship education and applies Gramscian concepts to the Chinese context (Adamson, 2014; Gramsci, 1971). While previous Chinese literature has extensively suggested the successful implementation of CSVs in IPE classes, there is a lack of comprehensive empirical studies in English (Vickers & Zeng, 2017). This investigation of CSVs in IPE includes analysing policy documents, and official textbooks, observing IPE classes in four universities, and conducting interviews with 40 IPE students and lecturers. The collected data is analysed to reveal the ways in which the Chinese authorities employ political indoctrination and political socialisation (Greenstein, 1970; Merry, 2005) to develop hegemonic common-sense understandings within Chinese civil society.

The study provides substantial evidence of the implementation of commitment to CSVs. It investigates the top-level design of policies from the governmental perspective, and how CSVs and official requests are enacted in IPE classrooms in detail. It also includes specific evaluations and assessments from IPE lecturers and students. The study reveals that the authorities are eager to establish a new form of common sense, leading people to believe that CSVs are essential values for the Chinese people. This fosters a cultural hegemony that reinforces the power of the authorities’ integral state (Gramsci, 1971). To fulfil official requests, lecturers also employ various distinctive strategies in terms of introducing and promoting CSVs, which can be categorised into three types of teaching approaches: 1) Confirmist, 2) Compromiser, and 3) Innovator. Additionally, both lecturers and students recognise the functions and aims of CSVs in education, but they also express reservations and offer suggestions for improvement in various perspectives, including policy-making, teaching practices, and assessment. Notably, these perspectives are often considered abstract, ambiguous, and lacking specificity.

IPE promotes CSVs as the standards that ensure the political and social stability necessary for China’s economic development and social evolution. This reinforces the ruling party’s perceived legitimacy and justifies civil society's compliance with political control. This educational model is distinctively Chinese and contrasts with more liberal models prevalent elsewhere in the world for building cultural hegemony. IPE was an important agent created by the authorities within political society, intended to consolidate the authorities’ dominance through training and education within civil society. The evolution of the IPE curriculum consistently reflects crucial socio-political changes within Chinese authorities since 1949. In a broader sense, IPE was established and modified for political purposes within political society, with its detailed curriculum and practices specifically reflecting this form of education within civil society. Changes to IPE might encompass pedagogical goals like citizenship awareness and moral education, but it is primarily oriented towards the ideological and political purposes of political society.

This paper draws on data collected by the author as part of his doctoral research. During the PhD study, the author employed qualitative approaches, including document analysis, semi-structured interviews, and class observation. The author analyzed current education policy and the official curriculum for IPE (Interprofessional Education) and CSVs (Core Social Values), exploring how authority establishes expectations and regulations for IPE and CSVs. Additionally, the author observed over 60 IPE sessions with 14 lecturers in four Chinese higher education institutes, investigating how IPE lecturers introduce and discuss CSVs in their teaching practice through specific approaches. Finally, the author conducted semi-structured interviews with almost 40 lecturers and students. This analysis delves into how lecturers understand CSVs and how students evaluate lecturers' teaching practices in order to assess their alignment with official values. In conclusion, three sources of data can triangulate and facilitate further discussion on policy-making, curriculum formation, teaching practices, and student evaluations.

Therefore, in terms of both content and process, there was central control. The authorities' requirements were intended to promote CSV through IPE, and the expectation was that this was to be carried out in an indoctrinatory fashion, serving as the first step to create common sense. At the same time, the CSV condenses official ideology into a set of explicitly stated values. In so doing, it makes it easier for students to memorise and reproduce these, and so encouraged a dominant position for the authorities. Generally, the government in political society prescribed CSV for education practice and performance in civil society. In this general process, civil society did not have the further autonomy to alter or refuse but only to accept and implement what the political society offered. IPE builds up “common sense” as Gramsci proposed and, in so doing, establishes a cultural “common sense” in the minds of young people. However, even among those who were compliant or positive, many actively decided for themselves which particular CSV they valued the most. Then there were the rare 'dissenters' who questioned the notion of IPE and CSV. Even some of the students who had critical comments about the CSV, still acknowledged in their reflections that CSV is a good sense for social change. Even this mildly critical viewpoint contributes to cultural hegemony in Chinese society. The final result is that common sense vis-a-vis CSV has been established in young people's minds, and this builds up cultural common sense led by the authorities and enables the party to strengthen its social evolution over Chinese society.

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