Dewey (1922), Piaget (1932), and more recently Own Flanagan (1996a, 1996b) suggest pragmatist accounts of moral learning which break from a familiar dichotomy. Traditionalists (e.g., Talbot and Tate, 1997) typically cast moral education as a process of socialization into a set of more-or-less epistemologically free-floating societal norms. Moral education in the progressivist mode (e.g., Wringe, 2006; Power, Higgins & Kohlberg, 1991) prioritizes, by contrast, the development of capacities of critical moral reflection and, accordingly, is careful to avoid presenting moral values, principles and conceptions of good moral character as something fixed and impervious to rational scrutiny and possibly rejection. On the alternative pragmatist picture, values and moral norms emerge in the rough-and-tumble of human social interaction, communication and reflection, a process that is animated by an interest in understanding what fairness, welfare and flourishing are and by a concern for creating conditions on the ground which are favourable to the realization of these social goods (cf. esp. Flanagan, 1996, pp. 128-130, 138 n. 28). Moral appraisal, in this view, takes on another aspect as well: the acceptability of a moral norm, principle, disposition or action turns less on its theoretical merits than on its usefulness, the extent to which it contributes to the practical goals of human life (cf. Carr, 2004). That the meaning and validity of moral norms originate in the intricacies of a particular social context notwithstanding, adequate norms, on this view, nevertheless have a genuine a priori claim to objectivity and universality insofar as they result from the application of critical rationality. In short, a morally acceptable norm is a norm that rational, appropriately concerned, and fully informed human beings would concede serves, in the balance, real social needs well. Because good norms are, under this interpretation, non-arbitrary, contextual and plumbed into practical human affairs it become attractive to speak of them as "social technology". As much as the pragmatist account of the genealogy and validity of moral norms seems to have going for it, I claim, it is unnecessarily limited by its individual-centred psychological focus. One need not look far to find examples of norms that seem to serve basic human interests well but which one would be very hard pressed indeed to discover and validate in a social milieu which is already governed by them-i.e., where they are in place primarily by custom and doing their job effectively. To illustrate this point, and substantiate the case that there are some acceptable and important norms whose objectivity and prescriptive force cannot be adequately comprehended unless they are viewed against the backdrop of the reasons why, during a formative historical period, they came to be widely regarded as principled dispositions of the utmost social significance (cf., e.g., Berlin, 1969; Midgley, 2004) I discuss three examples of institutionalized rights which fit the historical bill: (i) the valid claim to free religious and political expression; (ii) the invalid right to bear firearms; and, (iii) the ambiguous case of the right to privacy. The justification of moral norms with historically rich content-in moral education as in public discourse-as "rights" or as "constitutional guarantees" and where nothing more is said, I point out, mystifies moral principles which have a clear and specific social purpose and point.Conceptual analysis I conclude by observing that the existence of such historically-rich values affords an inviting opportunity for cross-curricular values education within the context of history education. In particular, the explanation of the meaning and point of these moral principles and connected social practices and institutions in reference to their historical background seems to be immune from the strongest objection to the values transmission model of moral education-i.e., that it supposes and publicly promotes social relativism if not nihilism (cf. Wringe, 2006)-but which is consistent with the strengths of this model-i.e., that it supports a sense of locally situated identify (cf. Talbot and Tate, 1997; O'Hear, 2004), contributes to the construction of an evaluative platform on which the meaningful exercise of critical rationality rests (cf. Peters, 1981; Feinberg, 1989), and its supposition that a society's basic moral principles gain a certain authority in virtue of containing some hard-won wisdom gained over long decades and centuries of experience trying to sort out how to live together (cf. Wynne, 1991).Berlin, Isaiah (1969). Four essays on liberty. London: Oxford University Press.Carr, David (2004). "The problems of values education" in John Haldane (ed.), Values, education and the human world. Exeter: Imprint Academic. Dewey, John (1922). Human nature and conduct. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Feinberg, Joel (1989). The moral limits of the criminal law: harm to the self, vol. 3. New York: Oxford University Press. Flanagan, Owen (1996a). Self expressions: mind, morals and the meaning of life. LondonOxford University Press. Flanagan, Owen (1996b). "The moral network" in R. McCauley (ed.), The Churchlands andtheir critics. London: Basil Blackwell.Midgley, Mary (2004). "Atoms, memes and individuals" in John Haldane (ed.), Values, education and the human world. Exeter: Imprint Academic. O'Hear, Anthony (2004). "The pursuit of excellence" in John Haldane (ed.), Values,education and the human world. Exeter: Imprint Academic. Peters, Richard (1981). Moral development and moral psychology. London: George Allen & Unwin.Piaget, Jean (1932). The moral judgment of the child. New York: Free Press.Power, F. Clark, Higgins, Ann, & Kohlberg, Lawrence (1991). Lawrence Kohlberg'sapproach to moral education. New York: Columbia University Press. Talbot, M., and Tate, N. (1997). "Shared values in a pluralistic society" in R. Smith and P. Standish (eds.), Teaching Right and Wrong. Stoke-on-Trent: Trentham Books. Wringe, Colin (2006). Moral education: beyond the teaching of right and wrong. DordrechtSpringer. Wynne, E.A. (1991). "Character and academics in the elementary school" in J. Benninga (ed.), Moral character and civic education in the elementary school. New York:Teachers College Press. The paper might at a later date be published in an edited volume of collected essays on the theme of Paideia but this is as of yet highly tentative.