School Desegregation and Educational Opportunities: Analysing the Impact of a “Lottery System” in Rio de Janeiro Public Schools

Author(s):

Tiago Bartholo(presenting / submitting)Marcio Costa

Conference:

ECER 2015

Network:

11. Educational Improvement and Quality Assurance

Format:

Paper

Session Information

11 SES 10 A, Educational Improvement: National Level (Part 3)

Paper Session continues from 11 SES 09 A

Time:

2015-09-10

15:30-17:00

Room:

102.Oktatóterem [C]

Chair:

Irina Maslo

Contribution

The paper analyse the impact of a desegregation educational policy on the patterns of school segregation in Rio de Janeiro public schools. This particular policy, called “lottery system”, started in 2010 and has been improved, with a constant increase in the proportion of families joining the new allocation system. In addition to the “lottery system”, Rio de Janeiro has an open enrolment system that combines two distinct procedures. On the one hand, parents have purported freedom of choice. There are no restrictions for allocating pupils regarding families’ residence and the policy of free public transport for pupils from public schools, in theory, allows greater mobility to search for different schools. On the other hand, schools’ principals have some control over their intake, especially in the case of oversubscription (Bartholo, 2013).

Previous studies in Rio de Janeiro public municipal schools suggested parental competition for the most prestigious schools and the pupil selection based on specific criteria by the school staff. The phenomenon was initially characterized as “Hidden-Quasi-Market” (Costa; Koslinski, 2011; 2012) or a “market ecology” (Yair, 1996) and is based on the assumption that: a) school intakes are correlated to school reputation and attainment levels; b) the potential to select pupils is also correlated to school reputation/demand. One of the main concerns from previous studies was related to the potential pupil selection.

The new lottery system has the potential to limit the power of school principals or administrative staff to select pupils based on specific characteristics. The new allocation system allows parents to choose up to five schools, in a hierarchical list. The preferences are uploaded to software for random allocation based on initial parental choice. The main difference here is that schools with oversubscription would not have any decision power over which family would get the vacancy. The main research question is: what is the impact of the lottery system on patterns of school segregation in Rio de Janeiro public schools?

Evidence from different educational systems suggests that clustering pupils with similar characteristics can influence how they are treated at school, the quality of teaching, aspiration to advanced education subsequent to the compulsory level, and an increasing association between academic achievement and socio-economic status. (Haarth et al., 2005; EGGRES, 2005; Rosenthal; Jacobson, 1968). Focusing disadvantage into areas or particular schools may also polarise information about future opportunities and remove role models, so influencing long-term outcomes such as levels of aspiration and endangers students’ sense of belonging in society (Gorard; See, 2013). Any attempt to overcome educational disadvantage should not ignore the role of school intakes.

Evidence from many different countries suggests that school segregation is a universal phenomenon and has to be considered as a consequence of residential segregation, educational policies and parental choice, which are presumed to correlate with social, economic and cultural isolation (Harris, 2011). The paper focus only on the role of one educational policy on school segregation and, therefore, a big part of the variation in the segregation levelswill not be explained by this model.

Method

The paper uses secondary data provided by the Rio de Janeiro Educational Department for all pupils enrolled in public schools from 2006 to 2013. There are around 1,300 schools providing preschool and Fundamental Educational and approximately 800 thousand pupils. In Brazil, the organization of grades and levels at schools is as follows: a) Preschool for pupils 4-5 years old, not compulsory; b) Fundamental Education is compulsory and attended by pupils 6-14. It is usually divided into five initial grades (First Segment) and the last four grades (Second Segment); c) High School, caters for pupils aged 15-17 and is not compulsory. Segregation here refers to an uneven distribution of pupils with similar characteristics across a school system and was assessed utilizing the Segregation Index (GS) (Gorard; Taylor; Fitz, 2003). Three different indicators of potentially disadvantaged pupils were calculated: a) poverty; b) parents’ education; c) ethnic background. The study presents two complementary research designs. Initially presents an interrupted time series designs, calculating the levels of segregation before (years 2006-2009) and after (2010-2013) the new policy. The calculations will include pupils from three specific school grades: a) entering preschool – 4 years old; b) entering first segment of fundamental education – 6 years old; c) entering second segment of fundamental education – 11 years old. Independent calculations of GS will be made for each cohort (each cohort has approximately 65 thousand pupils) and the patterns of segregation will be analysed separately. The second design compares the levels of segregation considering: a) all pupils enrolled in a specific grade (the same ones described in the first design); b) pupils that were randomly allocated using the new lottery system. The new enrollment system is mandatory only for pupils applying for their first registration. The aim is to observe and compare school segregation levels from families who chose the lottery system, with the entire cohort.

Expected Outcomes

Initial results suggest an increasing proportion of families joining the new lottery system since it started in 2010. The study only analysed pupils in three specific grades, because data indicated that those concentrated the highest proportion of families choosing the lottery system. Figures from the second design indicate that the segregation levels considering only families who join the new system is higher compared with the entire cohort, suggesting that the new allocation system could be making the educational system more segregated. However, initial figures from the interrupted time series designs do not show an increase in school segregation. There are a number of secondary analyses that will be made in order to explain the patterns presented.

References

Bartholo, T. L. (2013) Measuring between-School Segregation in an Open Enrolment System: The Case of Rio de Janeiro. Journal of School Choice, 7: 353-371. Bruel, A. L & Bartholo, T. L. (2012) Inequality of Educational Opportunities in Rio de Janeiro Public School System: Transition between Segments of Elementary School. Revista Brasileira de Educação, 17 (50), 303–328. Costa, M. ; Koslinski, M. C. (2011) A Hidden Quasi Market: Dispute for Common Schools in Rio de Janeiro. Cadernos de Pesquisa (Fundação Carlos Chagas. Impresso), v. 41, p. 246-266. Costa, M. & Koslinski, M. C. (2012) Escolha, estratégia e competição por escolas públicas. Pró-Posições (UNICAMP. Impresso), v. 23, p. 195-213. European Group for Research on Equity in Educational Systems (2005) Equity in European Educational Systems: a set of indicators, European Educational Research Journal, 4(2), 1– 151. Gorard, S., See, B. H. (2013) Overcoming Disadvantage in Education. London: Routledge Falmer. Gorard, S., Taylor, C., & Fitz, J. (2003). Schools, markets and choice policies. London: Routledge Falmer. Haarh, J., Nielsen, T., Hansen, E., & Jakobsen, S. (2005). Explaining student performance: evidence from the international PISA, TIMSS and PIRLS surveys, Danish Technological Institute. Available online at: www.danishtechnology.dk Harris, R. (2012). Local Indices of Segregation with Application to Social Segregation between London’s Secondary Schools. Environment and Planning, 44 669–687. Jencks, C.; Smith, M.; Acland, H.; Bane, M. J.; Cohen, D.; Gintis, H.; Heyns, B.; Michelson, S. (1972) Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America. London: Penguin Books Ltd. Rosenthal, R & Jacobson, L. (1968) Pygmalion in the Classroom: Teacher Expectation and Pupils' Intellectual Development. (New York. Holst, Rinehart & Winston). YAIR, G. (1996). School Organization and Market Ecology: a Realist Sociological Look at the Infrastructure of School Choice. British Journal of Sociology of Education, v. 7, n. 4, p. 453-471.

Author Information

Tiago Bartholo (presenting / submitting)

Federal University of Rio de Janeiro

School of Education

Rio de Janeiro

Marcio Costa

Federal University of Rio de Janeiro

Educational Foundations