School accountability policy and principals turnover: an exploratory study of Rio de Janeiro`s school system
Author(s):
Tiago Bartholo (submitting) Mariane Koslinski (presenting) Felipe Andrade Ricardo Ceneviva
Conference:
ECER 2016
Network:
09. Assessment, Evaluation, Testing and Measurement
Format:
Paper

Session Information

09 SES 03 C, A Spotlight on Latin America

Paper Session

Time:
2016-08-23
17:15-18:45
Room:
NM-F107
Chair:
Pablo Fraser

Contribution

This study investigates principal`s turnover conditioning factors and impacts in the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro from 2005 to 2015. In Rio de Janeiro´s public school system principals are assigned to elementary schools through election procedures that take place every three years.  In 2009, the municipality has adopted new policies that have increased pressure on school principals including: high stakes school accountability policy (i.e. bonus payment), support programs for low performing schools and exams requirements for teachers to be eligible for principals’ elections (KOSLINSKI; PORTELA; ANDRADE, 2014). The paper observes the patterns of principals’ turnover before and after the introduction of school accountability policies in Rio de Janeiro´s school system and investigates whether performance in school assessment systems and pressures from school accountability is associated to principals’ turnover. It also investigates the impact of principals´ change on students’ achievement in low performing schools.

International literature has been pointing out that principals´ turnover is usually associated to labor conditions such as salary, working day, institutional responsibilities, labour stress, principals lack of autonomy, bureaucracy and students demographic characteristics (DeANGELIS; WHITE, 2008; HERTLING, 2001; LADD; ZELLI, 2001; NI; SUN; RORRER, 2013; PAPA, 2007; PARTLOW, 2007; SHEPPARD, 2010).  Moreover, many studies have claimed that school accountability policies have led to increase in principals´ turnover, as an unintended consequence, especially in contexts where school accountability design is not able to adequately measure school effectiveness and, thus, it holds principals accountable for factors beyond their control (LADD, 2001). On one hand, principals’ turnover investigation becomes relevant considering the studies that observe significant variation in principals’ productivity, especially in low SES schools, and positive returns to principals’ experience. On the other hand, schools can benefit from turnover if principals` assessment and accountability policies are able to put pressure on less effective principals and to attract more effective ones (RONFELDT; LOEB; WYCKOFF, 2012)

Method

The analyses have made use of administrative and assessment data provided by the city of Rio de Janeiro Educational Department and by the Federal Government Ministry of Education. The data includes information on principals´ turnover from 2005 to 2015 and observation of 3rd, 4th, 7th and 8th grade students across five academic years (2009-2014) for all public schools of Rio de Janeiro´s educational system. The analysis use descriptive statistics to identify patterns of principals’ turnover and uses discrete choice models to estimate whether individual characteristics of the principals and the school they work, as well as school performance and the implementation of accountability policies, are associated to the following results: (i) principals re-election; (ii) principals not being re-elected; (iii) principals leaving the position during an appointment. The analysis is conducted during three cycles of principals´ appointment, including a period before the adoption of the school accountability policies by Rio de Janeiro´s government and two after. In order to observe the impact of principals’ turnover on student achievement in low performing schools, the analyses also estimate regression models with school-by-year fixed effects. The models control for prior student achievement and other student (sex, colour, parental education, poverty and family structure) and school (student input, infrastructure, teachers profile, and school complexity) covariates.

Expected Outcomes

The preliminary results show that principals´ experience, school infrastructure and size is associated to principals’ turnover in the three cycles investigated. Moreover, since 2009 principals turnover have systematically increased and the probability of principals not being re-elected or living the position during the appointment became highly associated to school performance in standardized tests. The impact of the turnover depends on principals’ replacement characteristics. Considering that there were no tools to evaluate or to make the principals accountable for students’ performance/achievement in Rio de Janeiro educational system prior to 2009, we expect to observe a positive gain of principal’s replacement on students’ achievement. A result in this direction would be a preliminary evidence of the capacity of the accountability policies and changes in principals´ election rules to attract more effective principals. This hypothesis can be investigated in future studies.

References

CHAPMAN, C. et al. (ed.) The Routlege International Handbook of Educational Effectiveness and Improvement: Research, policy and practice. Routledge: Abingdon, 2015. DeANGELIS, K. J.; WHITE, B. R. Principal turnover in Illinois public schools, 2001-2008 (IERC 2011-1). Edwardsville, IL: Illinois Education Research Council, 2011. FIGLIO, D.; ROUSE, C. Do Accountability and Voucher Threats Improve Low-Performing Schools? Journal of Public Economics 90(1-2): 239-255, 2006. HERTLING, E. Retaining principals. Eric Digest, 147. (ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED454567). Retrieved December 18, 2001. KOSLINSKI, M. C., PORTELA, C. & ANDRADE, F. Accountability escolar: um estudo exploratório do perfil das escolas premiadas. Estudos em Avaliação Educacional, v. 25, n. 59, 2014. LADD, H. F. School-Based Educational Accountability Systems: the promise and the pitfalls. National Tax Journal, Vol. 54, n. 2, 2001. ________. ZELLI, A. School-Based Accountability in North Carolina: The Responses of School Principals. Educational Administration Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 4, p. 494-529, oct. 2002. Principals’ Turnover, School Accountability, School EffectivenessNI, Y.; SUN, M.; RORRER, A. Principal Turnover: Upheavel and Uncertainty in Charter Schools? Paper presented at the University Council for Educational Administration (UCEA), 2013. PAPA, F. Why do Principals Change Schools? A Multivariate Analysis of Principal Retention. Leadership and Policy in Schools, no. 3, 267-290, 2007. PARTLOW, M. Contextual factors related to elementary principal turnover. Planning and Changing, 38(1/2), 60-76. Retrieved December 13, 2007 from Education Research Complete database, 2007. RONFELDT, M., LOEB, S. & WYCKOFF, J. How Teachers Turnover Harms Student Achievement. CALDER Working Paper no. 70, January, 2012. ROUSE, C.; HANNAWAY, J.; GOLDHABER, D.; FIGLIO, D. Feeling the Florida heat? How low-performing schools respond to voucher and accountability pressure. NBER Working Paper No 13681, 2007. SHEPPARD, R. R. Determining Factors that Influence High School Principal Turnover Over a Five Year Period. University of North Texas, Texas. 2010.

Author Information

Tiago Bartholo (submitting)
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
Rio de Janeiro
Mariane Koslinski (presenting)
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
Education
RIO DE JANEIRO
Felipe Andrade
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
Education
Rio de Janeiro
Ricardo Ceneviva
Rio de Janeiro State University
Political Science
Rio de Janeiro, RJ

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