The proposed paper aims at exploring the educational significance of mildness understood as a virtue. The interest in a recovery of this virtue is not completely new in the contemporary philosophical discourse, at least since the Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio (1996) drew our attention to it. While building on (some aspects) of Bobbio’s argumentation, the present reflection will principally focus on the ancient Greek understanding of mildness and on the possibility of deploying it also in contemporary scenarios.

In Greek, praos, understood as mild or meek, denotes a moral virtue that relates to the ability to be humble, gentle, gracious and kind to other people. The word praos is etymologically related to frijon, frionds, Freund and friend (Friedrich et al., 1968, p. 645). Gentle friendliness was highly praised among the Greeks as a social virtue in human relationships. The term is close to the word epieikeia, reasonable, fair and equitable, but also philanthropia, caring for or loving other people. Thus, the virtue of mildness integrates a social with an individual dimension. Plato understands mildness as the opposite of roughness (Plat. Sym., 197d) and Aristotle opposes it to bad temper or sudden anger and brusqueness (Aristot. Rhet., II, 3 1380a, 6; Eth. Nic. 1125b26). A praos, a mild person is therefore able to moderate and curb sudden emotions like harshness and retribution.

Being mild is not just a passive attitude; it requires a strong discipline to calm or moderate sudden and devastating impulses. Firmness is an integral part of mildness and represents the middle way between an inappropriate anger and a submissive passivity (Eth. Nic. 1125b25). Taking this middle way opens up a room of reflection and dialogue, and consequently it enables one to find alternative solutions to conflicts at an early stage. Mildness helps to counteract the blindness of anger. The hesitation or the delay of action exhibited by the mild person breaks the force field of anger and makes situational awareness possible. The ability to temper one’s passion will help to judge more accurately the situation at hand. Mildness, moreover, also entails resilience and the ability to stay put in times of adversary and setbacks.

Even if mildness is an individual virtue, it has far-reaching consequences for the community.  Mildness promotes and sustains community life and friendship (Good, 1999, p. 95).

As might have become apparent from this brief account, a re-appropriation of mildness as a virtue could play a pivotal role in facing many contemporary educational challenges. We will focus, however, on a specific educational practice and pedagogy. The springboard to this re-contextualization of Greek mildness will be provided by a passage from Plato’s Meno (75c-75d) in which Socrates portrays his method by opposing it to that of the eristic and disputatious philosophers (agonistikōn) and by characterizing it as being “milder and more dialectical” (praoteron pōs kai dialektikōteron).Thus, Socrates establishes a close bond or a sort of circuit between mildness and dialectics which results in a kind of philosophical friendship.

In this perspective, on the one hand, we will argue that educating for mildness is part and parcel of any endeavour to educate for reflective thinking through philosophical dialogue, insofar as no real dialogue could happen if the ‘agonistic’ thrust of the discussion overcomes “the only supreme ‘power’ […] which consists in ‘letting the other be himself’” (Bobbio, 1996, 8; see also Hadot, 2002). This co-belonging of education for mildness and education for thinking, on the other hand, will be investigated by examining the practice of the community of philosophical inquiry, to be considered as one of the contemporary heirs of Socrates’ stance (Lipman, 1988; 2003).

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