In recent decades, many countries have adopted privatization and market policies in education (Rizvi, 2016; Verger et al., 2016). Nevertheless, both national and international actors have become increasingly concerned about the negative effects of these policies, particularly regarding inequalities. At an international level, organizations such as UNESCO and the World Bank have highlighted the need for more regulations and greater accountability measures to avoid unintended and negative consequences of these policies and to limit the opportunistic behaviours (UNESCO, 2017; World Bank, 2018). Some scholars, however, have stated that privatization and market education reforms are politically difficult to dismantle mainly because they generate interest groups (i.e., private providers and parents with children attending private schools) who have vested interests in maintaining the voucher system (Carnoy, 2003), as well as the fact they generate public opinion in favour of market logics (Busemeyer & Iversen, 2016).
In this context, the education reform which has taken place in Chile over the last few years provides us with a unique opportunity to analyse the possibilities and limitations of reversing or regulating pro-market policies. Three decades after the pro-market reform, students’ unions and other civil society organizations have called for a structural reform in order to decommodify education and to mitigate the negative effects of market dynamics, in particular with regard to the resulting educational inequalities and segregation. After the success of the protests, in 2014, a new government came to power in Chile with an ambitious educational reform programme (Bellei, 2016). Regarding basic education, the reform had two main dimensions. The first concerned the prohibition of student selection, cost sharing and profit generation, especially common among private subsidized providers. The second focused on strengthening public education by recentralizing the management of public schools from municipalities back to the state and investing additional funds in this field.
The main objective of this research is to analyse the process of education reform in Chile, exploring how material and semiotic drivers have affected the process of policy adoption (Verger, 2014). The theoretical framework of the research is mainly based on the Cultural Political Economy approach (Jessop, 2010). This analytical framework allows us to divide the process of reform into three evolutionary mechanisms, namely variation, selection and retention. These three mechanisms do not entail a sequential understanding of the policy process but are a heuristic device to analyse the process of policy adoption. The research has three main research questions corresponding to each mechanism:
- Which drivers explain the need for educational reform? Which actors have been influential in positioning market reform at the core of the political debate?
- What were the different political positions during the discussion around the educational reform? How did different actors (proponents and opponents) position their approach in the public debate?
- Why were some parts of the educational reform been ultimately adopted and others omitted from education reform? What was the rationale behind the selection certain policy solutions over alternative possibilities?
Beyond the academic interest of the analysed case, the Chilean educational market reform experience can inform and contribute to the political debate around the regulation of education markets and privatization policies worldwide. In Europe, where several countries have adopted such privatization and market policies in the past decades, debates over the unintended consequences of these policies and the need for new and better regulation have been part of the recent political discussion on education. The Chilean educational reform is the first international attempt to reverse the effects of large-scale quasi-market in education, and therefore it represents an opportunity to empirically analyse the possibilities and limits of these policy reforms.