The influence of international consultants in the global south depends on their ability to define what counts as relevant information and to control its interpretation. This epistemic authority may initially rest on connections, resumes, and technical skills, but to maintain interpretive control consultants must also forestall critiques or alternative interpretations by local experts. As Choy (2011) writes, “international and mobile [expertise] . . . is posed against the knowledge of those who stay put . . . expertise must not only circulate but land as well” (87-88); cf. Koch, 2020). “Policy peddlers and gurus” such as Michael Barber (Peck & Theodore, 2010, p. 170; Cook & Ward, 2012, p. 140; Prince, 2014, Larner & Laurie, 2010; Peck & Theodore, 2012, p. 22) play key roles in this work through embodied performances of information to ministers, secretaries and staff of government policy units. The PowerPoint presentation is one of the political technologies they use to do this. Drawing on evidence from a study of the interactions of global consultants with the education ministry of a South Asian country, we examine how presentations structured around the software MS PowerPoint shape relations between consultants and state agencies, suture policy networks together at certain points, and silence local experts who might challenge the consultants or offer alternative interpretations and proposals. In this paper we build on theories of embodied policy mobilities (Larner & Laurie, 2010; Ball, 2016; Pow, 2019) and research on PowerPoint presentations (e.g., Bourgoin & Muneisa, 2016; Yates & Orlikowski, 2007; Kaplan, 2011; Knight et al., 2018; Stark & Paravel, 2008; Tufte, 2006) to show how the language, race, information asymmetries and policy aesthetics of PowerPoint performances structure the reception of European presentations and selling performances of projects and policies.
Unlike much of the research on policy networking, our focus is not the Western organizations or European actors (e.g., Clegg, 2010; Verger et al., 2018; Verger & Novelli, 2011; Steiner-Khamsi, 2018; Rappleye & Un, 2018; Junemann & Ball, 2015; Ball & Junemann, 2016), but on the perception of these actors by their “country-level (government and non-state actor)” interlocutors (Mundy & Menashy, 2014, p. 407; Ocampo & Neu, 2008). Such groups play critical roles in determining how international initiatives are accommodated or deflected, as the fates of such initiatives depend in part on the “receptivity or enthusiasm for change on the part of individual state actors” (Ball, 2016, p. 559). Part of our argument, however, is that state actors are not unitary or monolithic entities, but consist of different groups and “contradictory ensemble[s] of practices and processes” (Aretxaga, 2003, pp. 395, 396). Presentations by European actors play to at least two audiences: the high-ranking political officials who make decisions about accepting proposals or engaging external consultants, and what we call the reflexive audience of highly-trained workers in knowledge-intensive government policy units for whom the show consists of both the presentations by policy gurus and reactions of government leaders to those presentations. These workers, offer internal critiques, rarely articulated in public, that allow a “more careful parsing of indigenous and extra-local sources of influences and expertise” in global policy (Bok & Coe, 2017, p. 530), and in the process problematize assumptions about the “epistemic homophily” or “discursive coherence” of transnational policy networks (Ball, 2016, pp. 553, 554). Our work is based on semi-structured interviews of current and former employees of state-level policy units in a South Asian country.