Until recently, scholars characterised the far right as a heterodox “pathology” (Mudde, 2010) of post-war European democratic societies. The movement’s (re-)entrance into the political and societal mainstream since the 1980s has challenged this view. Studies show the radical populist right to exert a growing influence on European policy (Abou-Chadi & Krause 2020), while recent elections in Germany or Greece have disproved the long-held assumption that anti-democratic extreme-right positions cannot succeed at the polls (Mudde, 2019). In history and political science, these developments have been met with new research programmes aimed at incorporating far-right views and politics into mainstream theories of societal change. This literature shows that the European far right’s political (re-)integration has been accompanied by an intense cultural and intellectual programme, championed by think tanks and grassroots organisations, aimed at rendering far-right societal visions palatable to post-war societies (Bar-On 2007). The vocabulary and theories elaborated by these actors fed into the manifestoes and programmes of the growingly successful far-right parties across Europe, but not without being adapted to the logics of partisan politics (Carter 2005; Mammone 2015; Rydgren 2018). Education systems, as tools to structure future society and “imprint the conscience of the people on the individual”, as put by neofascist Casapound Italia (2019), plays a key role in both intellectual and partisan far-right programmes (Giudici forth.). This paper focuses on the differences and transfers between these two areas, asking: how do ideas and preferences on educational structures and aims vary across the intellectual and political far right? By answering this question, the paper aims to shed light on the role of ideological and partisan logics in shaping actors’ educational views. We present findings from a quantitative and qualitative content analysis on an original and systematic collection of official manifestoes and programmatic literature issued by European far-right parties and think-tanks, systematically relating educational positions to ideological orientations and the dynamics of party competition. Drawing on process tracing of key reform debates in Italy, France, and Austria – the countries hosting the most influential European intellectual (e.g., Grece, Ordine Nuovo) and partisan far-right organisations (e.g., Movimento Sociale Italiano, Front National, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, see Bar-On 2007; Mammone 2015; Mudde 2019), we provide additional insight into the involvement of partisan and non-partisan far right actors in education policy and their deliberations, negotiations and disagreements. The study contributes towards our theoretical understanding of the ideological, organisational and strategic underpinnings actors’ educational preferences.

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