The aim of the study is to analyse how researchers handle value-premises in environmental and sustainability education research. The theoretical perspective that is used consists of three ways of dealing with value-premises:  

1. Value-premises are explicitly stated and argued for,  

2. Values-premises are explicitly stated but not argued for, and  

3. Values-premises implicitly incorporated without discussion and seen as given and unproblematic.  

We will, furthermore, argue that it is crucial that researchers critically reflect on and argue for the choice of values-premises – as opposed to other value-premises (and values) – and discuss the possible consequences of not doing so.

Scientific research is traditionally based upon observation and empirical knowledge; it describes and explains and has the observable world in its focus. Scientific research thus differs from religion, ideology, and politics as these are built on opinions in which people’s values and norms are blended with descriptions and explanations (Myrdal 1970).

An implication of the focus on the observable world in science is that values – normally thought of as goals – in themselves are beyond the reach of scientists in their scientific – empirical – endeavour. Scientific research is characterized by scientific value relativism meaning that a value in itself cannot be empirically proved to be better or more correct than another value.  

Our point is that scientific research, in the sense of observation of observable reality, cannot prove that specific values are inherently superior and more important than other values (Brecht 1959). For example, if one considers the Covid-19 pandemic and the issue of the lock-down and its effects or consequences, there is no way for scientists to prove, through observations, that saving human life in itself is superior to, for example economic growth, human freedom, physical health, young people's education or the absence of domestic violence. Scientific research can, of course, by observation identify what values individuals, groups of citizens, politicians or policy makers prefer. But this is something different than choosing and deciding between conflicting values.

It is important to acknowledge that scientific research and scientific value relativism are bound together due to science focus on observation of reality. However, the claim is not unproblematic. Scientific research is performed by humans and is therefore, to a high extent, impregnated by values. Scientific research is characterized by value-based choices in all its parts, from the selection of a problem and theory, the operationalization, the collection of data to the analysis and the conclusions. But science is also in many cases driven by a chosen value-premise or, differently expressed, a chosen goal that the scientist desire and wants to be achieved. If we turn it around; there are few scientists who believe that scientific research is totally free from values. The key point, however, is that value-premises and values can be handled in a least three different ways: (1) Value-premises are explicitly stated and argued for, (2) Values-premises are explicitly stated but not argued for, and (3) Values-premises are implicitly incorporated without discussion and seen as given and unproblematic (Myrdal 1970). 

This study analyses environmental and sustainability education research from the three ways in which value-premises can be handled. It furthermore discusses why it is important that researchers critically reflect on and argue for the choice of values-premises.

The study is based on a qualitative text analysis (Lindberg 2017). In order to analyze how researchers, handle value-premises in environmental and sustainability education research a systematic reading of scientific articles from three journals published during 2022 will be done. The analysis consists both of systematizing and critical scrutiny of the content in the articles. The theoretical perspective used in the analysis is whether value-premises are (1) explicitly stated and argued for, (2) explicitly stated but not argued for, or (3) implicitly incorporated without discussion and seen as given and unproblematic.

Based on an ongoing study (Rafolt et.al, forthcoming) and previous studies and knowledge within the field (Urbas 2009) the expected findings are that value-premises to a large extent are present in the research on education for sustainable development. Furthermore, the expected findings are that value-premises and values are predominantly within categories 2 and 3, i.e. they are either stated but not critically discussed or implicitly incorporated without discussion and seen as given and unproblematic. The implications of the expected findings are several. Firstly, a lack of clarity regarding the difference between a) value-statements, (e.g., desired end states or goals), b) descriptive statements (e.g., descriptions and explanations) and c) prescriptive statements (e.g., norms and recommendations) (Lindberg 2017) contributes to a problematic confusion. The problem is a confusion of, on one hand, what scientific research is characterized by and what scientists as scientists can achieve knowledge about and, on the other hand, political activism. For example; there is a difference between a) empirically establishing that having one less child significantly reduce the individuals carbon footprint (Wynes & Nicholas 2017) and b) arguing that the government should prohibit citizens from having more than one child. Secondly, a lack of clarity regarding the fact that value-premises are chosen by the scientist (based on, for example, political ideology), might lead to the effect that citizens believe that the chosen values are scientifically proven. These implications can undermine both scientific research and democratic politics.

Brecht, A. (1959). Political theory: the foundations of twentieth-century political thought. Princeton, N.J.: Lindberg, M (2017). Qualitative Analysis of Ideas and Ideological Content, in Boréus, K and Bergström, G (ed.). Analyzing text and discourse: eight approaches for the social sciences. London: SAGE. Myrdal, G. (1970). Objectivity in social research. London: Duckworth. Rafolt, C et.al. (fortcoming). Values, descriptions and norms in research on environmental education and education for sustainable development. Urbas, A. (2009). Den svenska valforskningen: vetenskapande, demokrati och medborgerlig upplysning. Diss. Örebro : Örebro universitet, 2009. Örebro. Wynes, S & Nicholas, K (2017). The climate mitigation gap: education and government recommendations miss the most effective individual actions, in Environmental Research Letters, 12, issue 7.