The introduction of philosophy into schools has taken a particular tradition of philosophy as its only model. A.C. Grayling in his forward to a justly influential book looking at aspects of this movement contrasts philosophy as ‘love of wisdom’ with ‘reflective and critical enquiry’ and dismisses the first as inspiring but unhelpful and that latter as the way to go (Hand et al, 2009: xviii). Much philosophy in schools has followed this approach. This paper does not seek to challenge the benefits of understanding philosophy as Grayling and his fellow travellers, but rather proposes that in the context of the increased interest on ‘well-being’ and mental health in schools other traditions of philosophy, including those dismissed as ‘wisdom loving’ might actually be beneficial. An example of an alternative is Hellenistic therapeutic philosophy. I contrast two approaches to understanding this tradition to show that Grayling’s contrast is ill-informed because ‘wisdom’ traditions include critical thinking.

This paper adopts a philosophical method to examine two contemporary philosophers’ works, on the topic of the role of argumentation in Hellenistic philosophy. It uses methods of analysing, comparing and contrasting to acquire an insight on the topic in discussion.

Both Nussbaum and Hadot think that the practical aspect of Hellenistic philosophy does not exist in modern philosophy anymore. Nussbaum focuses on philosophy’s ‘commitment to reason’ and argues that this is at the core of Hellenistic philosophy. For Nussbaum, it makes philosophy the way human beings can discern the problems and injustices of the society they live in, and the way that they can search for effective ways to make improvement. Hadot also notices the differences between Hellenistic philosophy and other contemporary arts of life such as shamanism, stressing philosophy’s commitment to rationality. However, among these arts of life, Hadot focuses more on the difference between philosophers and Sophists, rather than that between philosophy and religion as Nussbaum does. For him, philosophy is, in essence, a way of being and doing, not just philosophical discourse. With the concept of ‘spiritual exercises’, Hadot also reveals that his understanding of ‘rationality’ is broader than that of Nussbaum’s. Finally, in terms of Hellenistic philosophy and Socratic philosophy, Nussbaum poses questions about the seriousness of any ‘commitment to reason’ on the part of Hellenistic philosophers. Hadot, on the other hand, once again presents a broader understanding of philosophical methods, which includes so-called dogmatic forms of teaching and spiritual exercises. This broader concept of philosophical teaching also generates a tension between authoritarian guidance and developing the ability to think critically. The Philosophy in Schools movement has so far been interested in developing one type of philosophical practice. The history of philosophy is full of many different practices. By looking at Hellenistic philosophy through the prism of Nussbaum and Hadot I suggest that the philosophy for schools should broaden out and consider other traditions rather than taking for granted that Grayling’s ‘reflective and critical enquiry’ excludes philosophical traditions pursuing wisdom.

Hadot, P. and Davidson, A. I. (1995) Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault. Chichester, West Sussex, UK, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. Hadot, P. (2002) What is Ancient Philosophy? Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Hand, M. and Winstanley, C. (eds.) (2009) Philosophy in Schools. London: Continuum. Nussbaum, M. C. (1986) The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Nussbaum, M. C. (1994) The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.