Abstract:

In Denmark teacher and engineer educations are professional bachelor degree educations and so the students must do a bachelor thesis on the background of the theoretical teaching and a practice experiences. But how are the concepts of knowledge that the student learn and are intended to learn to be understood when their reflections and analysis’ are not all theoretical or objective but also consists of reflections and analysis’ of their own engagement in tasks, pupils etc.? This calls for concepts of knowledge that can contain both theoretical and practical elements joint together in the students’ reflections on their practice experiences. By holding an Aristotelian perspective on knowledge one could on the face of it observe a clash between the practical phronesis or techné on the one side and the theoretical episteme concept of knowledge on the other. Still, the answer to the former question could very well be a practical concept of knowledge, because teacher and engineer educations are categorized as educations for professions and even though demands for higher academic levels are increasing, theses educations are very much looked at as practice-oriented. So, if we follow Aristotle it seems relevant to ask what the concepts of practical knowledge entails by asking the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) what embodiment means for understanding ‘meaning’, ‘action’, ‘choice’, ‘estimation’ etc. In this paper I will present some preliminary theoretical considerations on how I am going research on this in my PhD thesis by elaborating what I choose to call contact points between Aristotle and Merleau-Ponty in order to make it fruit full to use them together.

Research qustions:

1) How to understand the practical concepts of knowledge that students in professional bachelor degree educations such as teacher and engineer educations learn and are intended to learn as expressed in their bachelor degree thesis?

2) How is the practical concept of knowledge expressed as the student reflects on his/her bodily experiences and learning i the practice period in the bachelor thesis?

Theoretical framwork:

I examine Aristotle's work on the Ethics and in De Anima by use of modern and classical interpretations in a discussion with the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty in order to develop a framwork for analysing practical knowledge in terms of embodiment and reflexion.

International dimension:

This PhD thesis will have international dimensions due to the common and philosophical questions asked and to the network of collegues that will discuss the thesis

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