This study aims to contribute to the theoretical refinement of discretion in responses as it is used in a trust-based regime, which emphasizes cooperation and dialogue. Norwegian school inspection was picked as a case because of its particularly mild and trusting approach to regulatees (Levatino et al, 2024: 269-270; Painter & Guy Peters, 2010: 23). As such, this case is suited for reflections on discretionary dilemmas which might occur when inspectors are faced with undesirable practice while the commitment to cooperation and dialogue is pushed to its limits. In addition, the study aims to contribute to empirical knowledge about inspector discretion in the field of education, which currently only a modest number of studies do (like Dedering & Sowada, 2017; Hall, 2017).

The research question for this study is: how do Norwegian school inspectors use their professional discretion when they respond to undesirable school provider practice and what could be sources for their discretionary dilemmas? This question directs the gaze towards what inspectors in reality do in addition to what they formally are allowed to do, and also offers insights into how discretionary dilemmas may come about. By doing so, this study underlines the essential role of discretion in inspection: inspection is more than a tool to reach either technical or idealistic aims, but an institution which is continuously created in the interactions between social actors, including inspectors, who give meaning to policies and laws through the decisions they make (Meyer et al, 2021).

Street-level bureaucracy research on how inspectors use their discretionary room is a flourishing field. Many studies focus on discretion in interpretation and judgement (see, for example, Carter, 2017; Dedering & Sowada, 2016), that is how inspectors decide what part of the legal framework is applicable in a particular situation and how this situation should be judged. But some attention has also been paid to discretion in intervention, that is the course of action inspectors choose when faced with an undesirable practice (see, for example, Mascini, 2013). The studies commonly treat discretion as the room for inspectors to maneuver within an existing formal framework. While some describe this room as a recognition of professional competence and power (see, for example, Moberg et al, 2023: 1044), others emphasize its intrinsic vulnerability and doubt (see, for example, Raaphorst, 2018: 485). Despite these valuable contributions, however, the understanding of inspector discretion is still underdeveloped when it comes to intervention.

Developing this understanding is particularly relevant because of the shift to more “responsive regulation” over the last decades (Loyens et al, 2019: 2; Raaphorst, 2018). The idea of responsive regulation was introduced by Ayres & Braithwaite in 1992, and it steadily gained ground as an attractive alternative to a strict control-based approach without becoming powerless in the face of undesirable practice. As a result, inspection work has become much more than “ticking of boxes”, many scholars emphasize (see, for example, Raaphorst, 2018; Loyens et al, 2018; Rutz et al, 2017; Dedering & Sowada, 2017). Responsive regulation requires a high dependency on the professional discretion of inspectors across systems and policy fields (Raaphorst et al, 2022: 107-108). The shift underlines the societal importance of looking into how inspectors use their discretionary space in their everyday work, and not in the least how they deal with reluctant or uninformed regulatees.

To answer the research question, a single case study is being done with the help of interviews with Norwegian school inspectors and their direct leaders. In Norway, school inspection is a core task of the County Governor (Norwegian name: Statsforvalter). The County Governor is the collective name for the regional representatives of the state; Norway does not have a national education inspectorate for public schools. The regional agencies have the responsibility for overseeing multiple policy fields in their region and not just public education (DFØ, 2022: 20). Compared to education oversight systems in other European countries, like England and the Netherlands, Norwegian school inspection is mild: inspectors have no formal power to use or threaten with hard sanctions when they are observe undesirable practice; the only exception concerns situations in which individual children are in danger and feel unsafe to which the County Governor can respond with daily fines (Education Act, 2024: §12-8). In the case of undesirable practice, inspectors should first give a formal warning including a deadline. If the school provider has not or has insufficiently adjusted its practices after the deadline, the County Governor can consider offering a meeting to “discuss the situation”; in some cases, it might be “necessary” to have a “continuous dialogue” with the municipality to ensure “sufficient progress” (Udir, 2023: §8.3). For this study, semi-structured interviews are being conducted with individual inspectors and their leaders at different locations. To ensure credibility of the findings, inspectors are approached who vary in years of work experience and educational background and also work at offices in regions with variation in school density and professional capacity. The data is being analyzed with the help of thematic analysis for which a coding scheme has been developed. Half of the data collection has been done; the data collection is expected to be finished in June 2026.

Norwegian school inspectors use their discretionary room in different ways when faced with undesirable practice. They use the formal options given to them but also come up with their own solutions. Some identified responses so far are offering dialogue, repetition (“flat escalation”), change of tone, pushing orders up in the hierarchy, and shifting responsibility for coercion to the municipality. The lack of options for hard sanctions comes with several challenges, like being powerless in the face of those who are unwilling to change practices, and the time investment. The findings of this study will be used to contribute to empirical knowledge about inspector discretion in the field of education, while also offering a theoretical reflection on inspector discretion in responses.

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