The intricate interplay between reasoning, emotional experience, and behavior remains one of the central challenges in contemporary social and educational research. Decades of empirical evidence show that knowing what one considers morally right does not reliably translate into acting accordingly (Licon, 2025). This difficulty—commonly referred to as the knowledge–action gap and discussed through related conceptual labels (e.g. Darnell et al., 2019)—captures a shared challenge of translating moral insight into action. As such, it poses an urgent concern for moral, civic, and character education across Europe, with consequences for democratic coexistence and well-being (Brake & Nauta, 2022).
Despite this evidence, educational practice has traditionally privileged cognitive and performative outcomes, often assuming that moral reasoning will naturally guide behavior (Kohlberg, 1984). Such approaches underestimate the affective conditions shaping moral agency and rely on an overly intellectualized conception of it (Li, 2023). From an action-oriented perspective, character is not defined by what individuals know or endorse abstractly, but by what they are able to enact in concrete, emotionally charged, and relationally complex real-life contexts (Aristotle, 2014; Nguyen & Crossan, 2022).
While moral psychology has identified multiple correlates of moral action (Lake et al., 2025), far less attention has been paid to the mechanisms through which moral insight is implemented—or fails to be realised—under emotional and situational pressure. Many correlational accounts explain moral action, but do not sufficiently address how moral commitments are sustained or undermined in practice. Accordingly, this paper asks how ER can be theoretically understood as a moral capacity that supports value-consistent action under emotional and situational pressure.
Addressing this implementation gap, the present theoretical–analytic paper advances an integrative account of ER not merely as an influence on behaviour, but as a key mechanism through which the gap between knowing and acting can be addressed. Drawing on interdisciplinary research in moral psychology, affective science, and educational theory, the paper argues that ER is not simply a mechanism of psychological adjustment, but a a condition of coherent moral agency, character formation, and well-being. ER is thus conceptualised as a mediating process shaping whether moral commitments are sustained or eroded under affective and situational strain (Darnell et al., 2019; Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2024; Martínez-Priego & Romero-Iribas, 2024).
The analysis synthesises two influential psychological frameworks: Gross’s (1998, 2015) process model of emotion regulation (ER)—which specifies how emotions are regulated—, and Tamir’s (2016) motivational framework—which explains why particular emotional states are pursued. While both models provide robust descriptive accounts, they remain normatively indeterminate with respect to the moral orientation of regulation and its role in value-consistent action, reflecting the unavoidable philosophical assumptions embedded in emotion science itself (De Sousa, 2022).
To address this limitation, the paper introduces a neo-Aristotelian teleological framework—prominent in European moral education—which adopts a virtue-ethical understanding of moral agency grounded in practical wisdom (phronesis) and human flourishing (eudaimonia). Within this framework, ER forms part of the coordinated enactment of reason, emotion, and action (Aristotle, 2014; Darnell et al., 2019; Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2024; Martínez-Priego & Romero-Iribas, 2024).
By reconceptualising ER as a mechanism of moral implementation, this paper provides a conceptual bridge between psychological models of ER and normative educational aims. It situates its contribution in dialogue with key European reference frameworks, including those of the Council of Europe (2021) and the OECD (2021, 2025), while addressing conceptual gaps that remain under-theorised within these agendas. In doing so, it contributes to European educational dialogue on how education research and practice can move beyond performative skill acquisition toward a more integrated understanding of knowing, feeling, and acting in contexts marked by moral polarization, digital disinhibition, and emotional dysregulation.

This paper adopts a theoretical–analytic inquiry grounded in a purposive and conceptually driven review of interdisciplinary scholarship, combined with analytical synthesis. Rather than reporting original empirical data, the study aims to clarify a conceptual gap in existing research by integrating insights from psychology, philosophy, and education to develop a coherent explanatory framework for understanding ER as a moral capacity in educational contexts. The literature corpus was purposefully selected on the basis of theoretical relevance, empirical significance, and conceptual influence, rather than exhaustiveness. Sources were drawn from moral psychology, affective science, neuroscience, virtue ethics, and educational theory. Searches were conducted in major academic databases (e.g. Scopus, APA PsycINFO), using key terms related to ER, moral action, values, practical wisdom, and character education. The corpus includes both seminal theoretical contributions that have shaped contemporary debates and recent empirical studies that provide up-to-date evidence on emotional processes in morally relevant contexts. The analytical process unfolded in three stages. First, dominant psychological models of ER were examined, with particular attention to Gross’s process model and Tamir’s motivational framework. These models were analysed in terms of their underlying assumptions, explanatory scope, and implications for moral agency and educational practice. Second, selected empirical findings linking ER to moral behaviour, value-consistent action, and moral disengagement were synthesised to identify recurring patterns and limitations in the implementation of moral commitments under emotional pressure. Third, these descriptive accounts were interpreted through a neo-Aristotelian teleological lens, drawing on contemporary European scholarship in virtue ethics and character education. Conceptual integration was achieved through iterative comparison across disciplines, identifying convergences and tensions between psychological and philosophical accounts. This process resulted in an integrative framework that situates ER within a hierarchical structure of ER strategies, motivational goals, value orientations, and practical wisdom (phronesis), oriented toward human flourishing. This methodological approach is an explicit epistemological choice rather than a limitation. It prioritises conceptual clarification and interdisciplinary integration over comprehensive mapping, clarifying how ER operates as a mediating process between moral understanding and action. The method is particularly suited to educational research contexts where theoretical clarification is required to inform future empirical work and policy-relevant applications.

Persistent difficulties in aligning moral and civic commitments with action remain a central challenge for educational research in times of poly-crisis. European policy frameworks (Council of Europe, 2018; OECD, 2021, 2025) increasingly emphasise the enactment of values, knowledge, and attitudes to sustain ethical agency, social cohesion, and democratic life. However, educational approaches remain largely shaped by cognitive or skills-based models insufficiently integrated with affective and motivational perspectives. Although contemporary educational approaches increasingly acknowledge the relevance of emotions, ER remains theoretically under-integrated within moral educational frameworks. Moreover, ER is predominantly conceptualised in instrumental, adaptive, or hedonic terms—focused on emotional comfort, stress reduction, or performance optimisation—rather than as a capacity oriented toward relational, value-consistent moral action (Martínez-Priego et al., 2024). As dominant psychological models typically refrain from articulating a teleological orientation, educational approaches informed by them risk prioritising emotional adjustment and performative outcomes over moral discernment and civic responsibility (Saari et al., 2024). Consequently, learners may acquire techniques for managing affect without developing the capacity to remain morally responsive when emotional pressure tests consitency between values and action (Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2024). Against this background, the present analysis supports pedagogical approaches integrating emotional reflection, dialogical moral inquiry, and situated practice in ethically complex and relationally demanding contexts. Rather than treating ER as a context-independent self-management skill, the paper conceptualises it as a moral capacity. While ER has often been treated as one factor associated with the moral knowledge–action gap, this account shows how it can also function as a plausible and explicitly non-doctrinal pathway for addressing it by enabling value-consistent action under emotional strain. In doing so, the paper contributes to European educational dialogue on how education can move beyond performative skill acquisition toward a more integrated understanding of knowing, feeling, and acting in pluralistic contexts, with implications for moral, civic, and social-emotional education.

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