A common move in the study of creativity and education is to present creativity as an antidote to performativity. Might we therefore see work on creativity in education as heralding an era of post-performativity? In this paper, I consider whether or not this claim can be supported.

In the first part of the paper I argue that the portrayal of performativity in the literature on creativity presents an overly simplistic (vulgar?) understanding of what the former involves. In this literature, performativity is used to represent the tightening control over curriculum and pedagogy to meet externally imposed targets (Craft, 2005, pp. 128-129). Though this represents a “manifestation” of performativity, it is not constitutive of it. To demonstrate what is at stake here, I draw on Lyotard’s understanding of performativity. For Lyotard (1984), performativity is a narrative in which effectiveness has usurped Enlightenment narratives of truth and justice and ultimately comes to shape our understanding of the world.  On this view, target culture is not the whole of performativity but merely a symptom or manifestation of it.

During this paper, I contend that a vulgar or partial understanding of performativity is what leads writers to view creativity as its antidote. Though there is an obvious difference between simply getting students through exams and teaching creatively (or teaching “for” creativity), the notion that the latter is in conflict with performativity is questionable. Writing on creativity often emphasises problem solving (or the discovery of new problems) and represents creative teaching and learning as forms of technology. This sits uncomfortably with claims that creativity might break down performativity’s barrier and open a path to authenticity. The unhappy marriage between a technological understanding of being and “authenticity” can be seen in some of the theoretical literature that creativity experts draw on, particularly work in cognitive psychology.  Howard Gardner’s work on multiple intelligences is frequently cited in this literature.

In the next part of the paper, I argue that the relationship between creativity research and cognitive psychology is a marriage that is entirely congruent with performativity (in Lyotard’s sense). This is largely because notions of effectiveness take precedent over genuine concerns with truth and justice. Here I draw on John White’s article ‘Illusory Intelligences’ in which White dissects Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences and shows it to be “unintelligible”. Gardner’s response to White is interesting. He maintains that his approach conforms to a different paradigm to the one inhabited/utilised by White (Gardner, 2006, p. 295). Though Gardner does not say as much, I argue that this paradigm is ultimately concerned with what is deemed to work. Whether a theory stands up to critique at a conceptual level becomes immaterial. I suggest that this is true of much research on creativity and education

Craft, A. (2005) Creativity in Schools Tensions and Dilemmas (London, Routledge) Gardner, G. (2006) Replies to my Critics, in J.A. Schaler (ed.) Howard Gardner under Fire: The Rebel Psychologist Faces his Critics (Chicago, Open Court). Lyotard, J-F (1984) The Postmodern Condition (Manchester, Manchester University Press) White, J (2008) Illusory Intelligences in The Journal of Philosophy of Education, 42, pp. 3-4.