Research questions, objectives and theoretical framework

In this paper, we present a theoretical overview of some of the central epistemic aims and values of science. By aims and values, we refer to those epistemic criteria that guide the generation, evaluation and revision of scientific knowledge. Our research objective is to draw from the work of some contemporary philosophy of science perspectives that can inform science education research and practice. The key research questions are (a) what epistemic perspectives on scientific aims and values are useful for informing science education? and (b) how can these perspectives be transformed for use in practical educational contexts? The broader curricular context of this type of work is the recent policy calls for the inclusion of epistemic dimensions of science in science instruction (e.g. Eurydice, 2012; OECD, 2006), and the established research domain of history and philosophy of science in science education (Matthews, 1994).

The theoretical framework relies on extant philosophical discussions focused on scientific aims and values. For example, Irzik & Nola (2011) review the aims and values of science citing the work of Kuhn (1977), Hempel (1965), Popper (1975), Von Glaserfeld (1989), van Fraassen (1980) and Longino (1997) to generate the following cognitive aims of science: “consistency, simplicity, fruitfulness and broad scope, high confirmation, falsifiability and truth or at least verisimilitude, empirical adequacy, viability, ontological heterogeneity and complexity”(p. 597). Furthermore, they illustrate how different philosophical traditions would differ on their interpretation of the aims and values of science. For example, they describe how some philosophers’ accounts might be in direct opposition to others’, like Longino’s ontological heterogeneity and complexity clashing with Kuhn’s simplicity, as aims of science. They present a nuanced discussion illustrating the complexity in representing different philosophical traditions’ interpretation of scientific aims and values. For example, when they discuss the values of ‘simplicity’ and ‘explanatoriness’ they illustrate how these values can serve different functions depending on the way they are used either as evaluation criteria for theory choice or as components of methodological rules in science.

Carrier (2012) reflects on a range of scholars’ work including the Mertonian values of universalism and communalism. Other scholars have pointed out the difficulties in distinguishing epistemic and cognitive values in science (Wilholt, 2009) while others have claimed that social and cognitive values cannot be coherently distinguished (Machamer & Douglas, 1999). Longino (1993-cited in Carrier, 2012) on the other hand, proposes procedural standards such as “taking up criticism” and “responding to objections appropriately”. According to Longino, epistemic spirit of science is distinguished by taking challenges seriously and by trying to cope with them. Another one of Longino’s procedural standards is ‘equality of intellectual authority’. This community rule is supposed to preclude personal or institutional power playing; and arguments should be appreciated independently of community hierarchies.

Selected References Allchin, D. (1999). Values in science: An educational perspective. Science & Education, 8-12. Carrier, M. (2012). Values and objectivity in science: Value-ladenness, pluralism and epistemic attitude. Science & Education, DOI 10.1007/s11191-012-9481-5. Eurydice (2012). Developing key competences at school in Europe: Challenges and opportunities for policy, pp. 1-72, Brussels: European Commission. Irzik, G. & Nola, R. (2011). A family resemblance approach to the nature of science for science education. Science & Education, 20, 567-607. Longino, H. (1995). Gender, politics, and the theoretical virtues. Synthese, 104, 383-397. Matthews, M. (1994). Science teaching: the role of history and philosophy of science. New York: Routledge.