Our central question is: what kind of confidence should we have in philosophical analysis and argument as a basis for policy and what is the nature of the inference between such analysis and argument and recommendations for policy? Noting the widespread resistance to abstract theorizing, we defend the claim that philosophical reasoning should be an integral part of policy development and critique. In doing so we do not suggest that philosophy can replace the political process but rather we show how it can complement the politics of policy. The relationship between philosophy and policy has been the subject of contrasting arguments among philosophers of education. These range from the view that successful education policy requires the contribution of philosophy to be viable, to a more circumspect one that philosophy can offer a more modest contribution. Our approach will favour the former, more expansive approach.Defending the necessity for a philosophically refracted policy process, we explore a range of examples of education policies to illustrate our claim that a less instrumental and more philosophically informed approach would draw on philosophy as one of the forms of relevant research from which educational policy can be derived.