Why it is so difficult for research evidence to influence educational practice? Many educational scholars tackle this problem from the supply side, arguing that we need stronger and more rigorous evidence (Cook & Payne, 2002). Yet another equally important facet to greater evidence use is the way that practitioners and policymakers interpret and makes sense of evidence. In this paper I use research from the psychology and sociology literature to argue that peoples’ interpretations of research evidence often has very little to do with the quality of the evidence itself, but rather that people interpret evidence based on prior beliefs and values. A host of studies in fields including health, education, and politics suggest that even when presented with strong evidence that confronts preference, people often have very different interpretations that may even entrench, previously held positions (Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979; Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000; Bastardi, Uhlmann, & Ross, 2011). This pattern particularly holds for issues that are highly charged and value laden (Haidt, 2001) One explanation of this phenomenon is that people hold onto prior beliefs because they are an integral part of identity (Cohen, Aronson & Steele, 2000). If beliefs are an important part of valued identity, asking people to be swayed by evidence – particularly when they hold a prior view contrary to the presented information – is akin to asking people to adjust their identity. In essence, our deep seated beliefs about the values represented within an issue drive our interpretation of the evidence about it. But where do our beliefs come from? Sociologists have postulated that social affiliations play a large part of belief formation (Pratkanis, & Greenwald, 1989). Putnam (2001), for example, argues that communal activities, religious affiliation, and group membership create the social bonds that influence individual beliefs, preferences, and actions. Finally, there are a few clues in the literature about how we might mitigate the protective mechanisms that impede people from considering the lessons from research evidence. Cohen, for example, has conducted several studies that indicate that self-affirmation can make people more open to alternative information (Cohen, Aronson & Steele, 2000). The paper concludes with a set of proposed empirical studies to explore this phenomenon with education policymakers and practitioners.

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