In the last decades, most countries in the world have introduced accountability mechanisms in their education systems. The predominant model is based on national standardized tests that measure students’ learning achievement at the school level. The stakes attached to test-based accountability (hereafter TBA) vary from context to context. While in some cases test results are associated to material incentives and sanctions for schools and school actors, in other cases, test results are associated to both tighter forms of school supervision and reputational consequences. In TBA systems, obtaining good test results becomes a central goal. Because of this, TBA increasingly changes educational practices at the school level (Lingard et al., 2013) and eventually favor the emergence of undesired behaviors that could threaten educational quality and jeopardize the content of the curriculum, as academic literature has highlighted (Ohemeng and McCall-Thomas, 2013). Few studies have until now specifically focused on both formal and informal strategies adopted by school leaders to improve results when dealing with national standardized tests (Jennings, 2010). Based on survey data collected in Chile and Spain, this paper fills this gap by using a novel survey-based experimental conjoint design. This experimental approach accounts for the multidimensionality of strategies adopted by school leaders, but it also helps addressing the potential desirability bias that could arise when talking about undesired behaviors. In this study, we specifically explore which types of pedagogical and organizational strategies are preferred by school leaders, and assess how personal and contextual factors are related with different strategical preferences. Such strategies range from those related to the use of data from assessments for instructional improvement and staff and curriculum management to cream-skimming strategies (in which schools, in an attempt to become more competitive aim to select the academically most able students). The study is also relevant from the policy perspective due to its potential to identify the pedagogic, organizational and social effects of different types of TBA policies.

Jennings, J. L. (2010). School Choice or Schools’ Choice?: Managing in an Era of Accountability. Sociology of Education, 83(3), 227-247. Lingard, B., Martino, W., Rezai-Rashti, G. (2013) Testing regimes, accountabilities and education policy: commensurate global and national developments. Journal of Education Policy, 28(5), 539-556. Ohemeng, F., & McCall-Thomas, E. (2013). Performance management and “undesirable” organizational behaviour: Standardized testing in Ontario schools. Canadian Public Administration, 56(3), 456-477.